Jim Marrs Interviews Doug Horne

http://www.unknowncountry.com/media/?cur=485

DREAMLAND with Whitley Strieber
February 20, 2010 Kennedy Assassination

JFK Assassination researcher Jim Marrs interviewing Doug Horne, Chief Military Analyst for the Assassination Records Review Board - in operation from 1994 –1998

JM: = Jim Marrs
DH: = Doug Horne

[ 00:00 - 00:32 – announcer lead in...]

00:32:

JM: Howdy, I’m your host today here on Dreamland, on a very special occasion because today we’re going to hear from Doug Horne. Doug was the chief Military analyst for the Assassination Records Review Board, and to just set the stage, let me explain that in the wake of the Kennedy Assassination, of course, within a week the new President, Lyndon Johnson hand picked a committee headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren and called the Warren Commission - prominent people on there such as John J. McCloy, Allan Dulles, who I found particularly interesting since Kennedy had fired Dulles from his position of CIA director in the wake of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion and Gerald Ford, our only unelected President and some others - and they concluded after about nine months that the assassination was the work of Lee Harvey Oswald who acted alone.

This was called into question almost immediately and a few years later we had the Jim Garrison investigation in New Orleans and the jury who was polled afterwards, unanimously said that Garrison had convinced them that there was a conspiracy to kill Kennedy, but they could not bring themselves to believe beyond a reasonable shadow of doubt that Clay Shaw was part of it, so they found him not guilty. But this raised even more questions particularly with some of the witnesses and information that came out in the Garrison trial. So then in the mid 70’s Congress founded the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and they went through a lot of turmoil, changed leadership, and Blakey, the new Chief Council started off by saying they weren’t going to consider any new evidence. Anything new they didn’t want to hear about it, but they would re-examine some of the old evidence, well that forced them into considering the Dallas Police radio tape which according to two separate sets of acoustical scientists showed clearly that there had been shots not only from the School Book Depository but from the infamous Grassy Knoll.

But, the House Committee said well we’re out of funds, we’re out of business, and they encouraged the Justice Department to continue their investigation. This was not done, in fact all the Justice Department did was convene a handpicked committee of National Science Academy people who tried to call into question the Dallas Police tapes. A few years later, in a peer reviewed paper in England they called into question the conclusions of the National Academy of Science Committee. So the whole thing has been in controversy and turmoil ever since. And finally, in the early 90’s we had the Oliver Stone film “JFK” which was based on Jim Garrison’s book, and my book “Crossfire: The Plot That Killed Kennedy”. And in the wake of the controversy that stirred up - Congress then named the Assassination Records Review Board.

And this was a group of citizens who were tasked to go into government files and find anything that pertained to the Kennedy Assassination Unfortunately, they were also instructed NOT to do anything with it, don’t make any conclusions, don’t present any of their findings or conclusions to the public, just put all the stuff in the National Archives and maybe twenty or thirty years later some diligent researcher might actually find something.

Well Doug Horne is the man. He is not only a diligent researcher, he was the Chief Military Analyst for the Assassination Records Review Board which put him right in the thick of what they were finding out about the Kennedy autopsy, which of course was done at Bethesda Naval Hospital.

And he even had opportunity to speak with and interview some of the people involved in the autopsy, and he was also privy to the examination of one of the most critical pieces of information – evidence – the famous Zapruder film taken by Abraham Zapruder.

So Doug, I apologize for that long-winded introduction, but now that we’ve laid the groundwork, tell us what you found in your work for the Assassination Records Review Board.

DH: Well, thanks Jim, it’s a pleasure to be here, and don’t apologize, the case IS a mess and it’s been made into a mess by all those investigating bodies, so –

What I found Jim, was that, and these are my conclusions, you know, after working for the Review Board for the last three years of it’s four year lifespan and my conclusions after researching and writing this book for thirteen years, this book “Inside the Assassination Records Review Board”, available on Amazon.com. It’s my conclusion that the reason the case has never come together like a normal homicide case is because there’s massive fraud in the evidence. And, it’s a pretty strong statement to make, but it’s backed up in my book by overwhelming evidence, of not only fraud in the evidence. But what that means is a massive cover-up of the medical evidence by the U.S. Government. And, specifically a cover-up of the fact that the President was killed by a crossfire and that evidence of shots from the front was suppressed and only evidence of shots from the rear was admitted into evidence. So the listeners may be wondering – well, wat do you mean by fraud in the evidence – and to summarize very very briefly, without getting inside baseball too much – there are three skull x-rays of the President, and those three are not originals in the national archives, they are copy films. They are altered copy films made from the original skull x-rays and altered in such a manner that the blowout in the back of the head, the exit wound behind the right ear, seen in Dallas by all the Doctors and Nurses has been hidden in the x-rays, it looks like solid bone, but we know they are forgeries.

Number Two: The autopsy report’s been rewritten at least twice, so the version in the archives now is the third written version, and the - particularly disturbing to me is the fact that the brain photographs in the archives, purported to be of President Kennedy’s brain cannot be of his brain as proven by the testimony of two key witnesses. The - one of the FBI Agents who was at the autopsy, Frank O’Neil said - they cant be of President Kennedy’s brain because there is way too much mass present, there is too much tissue present in the organ in the photographs. And, the photographer who took the pictures said - No these can’t be the pictures I took, because they’re taken on the wrong kind of film and they are taken from the wrong angles. And they also don’t show the sections that were made of the brain.

So those are three key areas where there is fraud in the evidence, there are others, but that’s it in a nutshell.

JM: Okay, so in other words what you are telling me, is that when someone steps forward and says – yes but look, this government document states thus and so, you cannot take that to the bank, can you?

DH: That’s correct Jim. Normally the autopsy report is THE medical legal record of someone’s death. In this case, it’s not true since we know at least two written versions of the autopsy report, a typed first draft, and the first signed version, have been destroyed. The autopsy report cannot be used to describe how Kennedy died.

JM: Right, Okay. Well that’s Step Number One. We’ll go to step this up to Number Two, right after this.

[- to 8:50 - commercial break]

12:18:

JM: Howdy, We’re back here today, this is your host Jim Marrs. We’re talking with Doug Horne, Chief Military Analyst for the Assassination Records Review Board and he’s just informed us that the autopsy on President Kennedy has been altered, fabricated, changed, at the level of the Federal Government. So, Doug, tell us how you KNOW this.

DH: Sure Jim, we know from the testimony taken of Doctors Humes and Boswell – there were three pathologists and President Kennedy’s autopsy, two of them were Navy and they were the lead doctors at the autopsy Doctors Humes and Boswell. The third guy was kind of an outsider, Dr. Finck worked for the Army and he arrived late after the autopsy had started and he was basically a consultant, advising the other, the two Navy men. So we took the testimony of all three...

JM: Excuse me had any of these military doctors had any kind of extensive experience with gunshot wounds?

DH: Almost no, no, almost no is the answer. Doctors Humes and Boswell, the two lead pathologists had no practical experience in forensic autopsies of people killed by trauma, by gunshot wounds. They had only done autopsies of people due to natural - death due to natural causes. And Dr. Finck, the consultant, was a board certified forensic pathologist, but number one, he arrived late, after much of the work had been done Number two, he did not do this every day, he only reviewed reports written by other people. So there was almost no practical experience in forensic pathology during the autopsy on the 35th president, which is really appalling. In retrospect I believe this was intentional. You can steer the conclusions of people who aren’t really qualified in the first place not only because they are in uniform and are following orders but because they’re not forensic pathologists, the two lead pathologists were not , so...

JM: Is it true, that they were – when - I think it was Finck, or one of the autopsy doctors – there was some argument going on about what to do, how to do it – and he said – Well who’s in charge here – and a military officer said – I am – is that true?

DH: That’s correct. During the Shaw trial, Dr. Finck had a rough time on the witness stand and the first day he testified he made that statement under oath, he said – I said, Who’s in charge here – and Dr. Humes – Dr. Finck recalled that Humes the lead pathologist had said – Who’s in charge here – you know, irritated with all the interference during the autopsy and the people giving orders and that - Finck said under oath, an Army General said – I am. He tried to back away from that during his later testimony at the Shaw trial but it was too late, he had already said it under oath, and in fact we know he was being coached – I mean, he was doing so badly on the witness stand that - in terms of telling the truth that other people didn’t want him to tell that, they called Dr. Boswell down and had him waiting in the wings to take over and to get up there and rebut Finck if necessary, so Boswell revealed to us under oath something we didn’t know, that he was called down there by the Justice Department to help with the defense team, and was waiting in the wings because Pierre Finck was doing so badly...
JM: So [... -ive ?..] testimony..

DH: Yeah, so to make a long story short, yeah, Dr. Humes admitted in 1964 to Arlen Specter - To Assistant Council Arlen Specter on the Warren Commission - admitted that he burned the first draft of the autopsy report in his fireplace on Sunday, the weekend of the assassination.

JM: Um,hm

DH: The problem for Humes is that during the House Committee period in the mid 70’s he changed his story, and he said – Well I destroyed the notes in my fireplace, I destroyed notes - because they had the blood of the President on them and he thought it was unseemly. Well, that’s a conflict right there, so when he testified before us General Council Jeremy Gunn really bore in on him on this subject and Humes finally admitted that he destroyed both, the first draft, and notes. So that’s the first – and by the way, Dr. Boswell told us under oath that the first draft was actually typed and it was prepared on Saturday. Boswell told us [..?..] it was prepared Saturday and reviewed by he and Humes, and we also know the third party, Dr. Canada, commanding officer of the hospital portion of the Bethesda complex, those three men reviewed it on Saturday, Humes destroys it in his fireplace the next morning, early Sunday morning. So that’s the first version that’s been destroyed. The second version was a signed version that was given to Robert Kennedy in 1965 by the Secret Service at his request. He was a Senator at that time, from New York and then a year and a half later, when he was required to turn over all the autopsy materials he had in his possession back to the Government so they could be put in the archives – he returned the photographs and x-rays but he did not return a signed version of the autopsy report, along with the - what was left of the brain and other biological specimens. So he kept part of these materials and they’ve never seen the light of day again. So, ah….

JM: So what you’re telling us is, is that standard operating autopsy procedures were NOT followed in the case of the JFK Assassination.

DH: Certainly not with the evidence. I mean the evidence was made by the Government, it never should have been turned over to someone’s family. And when they returned it to the Government, and the Government knew immediately that he had not returned all the materials and that he had kept biological materials, tissue samples, the brain, plus a signed autopsy report. They didn’t go after him, they just let it go, which was appalling. So we know that the next year in 1967, the year after the Kennedy’s returned the materials to the archives - The next year the Secret Service turned over an original autopsy report to the National Archives, and that’s the one we have today, and that’s the third version. In other words Jim, if you – if there’s only one autopsy report, no one can give it to someone else twice. See, you have the Secret Service on record giving a signed autopsy report to Robert Kennedy in 1965 and then he keeps it and doesn’t give it back. And then the Secret Service turns over ANOTHER signed autopsy report two years later to the archives, and that’s the version that’s on file now and therefore I conclude that’s the third written version. So that’s just completely unacceptable.

JM: You think the third version which is now the official Government version, do you think it accurately reflects what was actually found at the Kennedy autopsy?

DH: Oh, no. It is the version that concludes that a bullet transited the body And that was not a conclusion, you know, from back to front, from the upper back at the throat That was not a conclusion of, at the autopsy, the FBI agents were there and they wrote their own report and they know that was not a conclusion during the autopsy itself and I don’t believe that was the conclusion in the version that Robert Kennedy sequestered either. So that was one conclusion that evolved and of course there is no mention of any shot from the front in the autopsy report that exists today and I don’t believe there was in the earlier versions either because that evidence was surppressed during the autopsy itself. I mean, the cover-up began the moment the body arrived. So no, the conclusions were evolving, and that’s why you have different versions, and all that’s all laid out in Chapter Eleven of my book.

JM: Okay so they altered the autopsy report. What about the President’s body, there has been some speculation there may have been alteration actually to the body. Do you have any knowledge of that?

DH: There was, Jim. I consider it a certainty, now. This concept was first raised in 1981 by David Lifton and his outstanding book “Best Evidence” which he worked on for fifteen years. By the way it was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize, it didn’t win but it was nominated, which is remarkable…

JM: Um, hm

DH:...and given the subject matter - and Macmillan at the time was very brave to publish that book. So Mr. Lifton believed that the body, the wounds on the head, had been altered before the body had arrived at Bethesda and my conclusion is that he was close but he wasn’t really correct, and I’ve altered my view of this because we just know more now than we did in 1981. We know a lot more, based on the ARRB’s depositions and interviews. I’ve concluded that, yes, the head wounds were altered by surgery, by post mortem surgery after death but it happened at Bethesda before the autopsy began. You see, there was a long period of time, Jim, between the body actually arrived and the time the autopsy started, the body arrived at 6:35 p.m. we know that because of a report written by a Marine Security Guard, Sargeant Boyajian and so it arrives at 6:35 p.m., the autopsy doesn’t begin until 8:15. 8:15 p.m.

And there is a lot of time there for shenanigans to take place, and the shenanigans WERE taking place. We interviewed Tom Robinson, one of the morticians, who prepared the body for burial after the autopsy. He was there for the whole period, he was there for the whole autopsy. We also deposed the two x-ray technicians and one of them, Ed Reed - Ed Reed the autopsy tech and Tom Robinson, the mortician they [.. bo....surgury...] to the President’s skull, done by Dr. Humes. And from the way they described the details of that surgery it’s clear that what Dr. Humes was doing was expanding the exit wound that was seen by the Dallas doctors and nurses, expanding that wound dramatically to five times its original size so that now there’s a large defect on the top of the President’s head and on the right side – which was not present in Dallas.

The reason for him doing that, the primary reason, was to get to the brain and remove evidence. Remove evidence of the shot from the front. Remove the entry wound in the upper right forehead with an incision, remove the entry wound in the bone. Remove part of the skull plate, and remove bullet fragments from the brain, and along with it a lot of brain tissue was removed. So this is – and the process of doing this, you’ve got a much larger skull defect when you are finished with this illicit surgery and that large skull defect is misrepresented by the camera, and in the autopsy report, and this represented to history as – quote - damage caused by an exiting bullet – unquote. So this [...] large defect done by the doctors which Tom Robinson was adamant about. He looked at the autopsy photos and said - Oh all this damage at the top of the head, he said – this is not what the bullet did, this is what the doctors did. He was there, he knew that.

JM: So what you are telling us is that these alterations, these shenanigans as you called them, they certainly could not have been done by Lee Harvey Oswald, or by the Russians, or the by the Mafia, or by the anti-Castro Cubans, right?

DH: Exactly, and to prove that point, Jim I will make if brief here but – the body left Dallas in an ornate bronze viewing casket very heavy, over four hundred pounds, made of bronze, with the top half that opens up for viewing, and it arrived at Bethesda in a different casket and in different wrappings. It arrived in a cheap aluminum shipping casket and instead of wrapped in sheets, wrapped in a body bag with a zipper. So the body was not only intercepted in route, where I believe the throat wound was - there was an entry wound in the President Kennedy’s throat seen in Dallas by all the doctors. And that was tampered with before the body arrived at Bethesda. But after the body arrived, the skull wounds were tampered with by the pathologists themselves. So that makes it very clear that interruption in the chain of custody makes it very clear that it was an inside job by the Government.

JM: Right, that’s amazing. Okay, well, we’ll proceed along to Step Three of the analysis of the Kennedy Assassination, when we return right after this.

[- to 25:15 - commercial break]

28:47:

JM: Howdy, This is Jim Marrs. We’re back here again on Dreamland, and we’re talking today with Doug Horne, Chief Military analyst of the Assassination Records Review Board an we are learning some amazing things, that the basic evidence in the Kennedy Assassination cannot be trusted. Doug lets move on to the Zapruder film, what can you tell us about the Zapruder film which has been called “the clock” of the assassination.

DH: Right,you know for the first thirty years or so, after it was taken by Mr. Zapruder, that one preeminent film of the assassination, the only one of the films that really shows detail of any kind. It was studied – the image content was studied for the first thirty years and people wanted to know what can it tell us about what happened. So for the first thirty years the debates about the film were about the image content.

For the last fifteen years or so, the debate has been, really, is the film authentic or not. The whole territory of the debate, the structure of the debate has changed dramatically and it’s my conclusion, after working for the review board, after we commissioned a limited, I add, I emphasize, LIMITED authenticity study of the film by Kodak. And after studying his report, his report raises more questions than it answered – it’s a very biased and flawed report. And I write about that extensively in my book in Chapter Fourteen. And it’s my conclusion today for two reasons which I’ll enumerate in a moment that the film is an altered film. Altered to hide evidence of an exit wound on the back of the President’s head. It’s been blacked out on the film, and altered to actually paint on a false exit wound in the right front of his head, which mimics, not perfectly either, which generally mimics the enormous damage in these fraudulent autopsy photos which show really, the results of surgery. So the real exit wound behind President Kennedy’s right ear, in the back of his head has been blacked out on the film, a false exit wound has been painted onto the right front and the top of his head, to mimic the autopsy photos – and because those alterations are so apparent now for reasons I will explain in a moment, they are so apparent.

All the other things, Jim, that we thought we knew about the film for thirty years are suspect now. So, the first generation researchers who studied the film and who spent countless hours, hundreds of hours, studying this thing frame by frame concluded there was a timing problem. And that President Kennedy and Governor Connally were shot too close together to have been done by the same rifle and that therefore, their reactions to two different shots occuring very close together was evidence of multiple shooters from behind. That was the original conclusions of the first generation researchers. But I got to tell you, Jim, there are some fifty witnesses or more - that the limousine came to a complete stop during the motorcade, for an instant - for a second or two, and that’s not seen in the film today. So if a car stop has been removed as well, and by the way – something else is not present in the film that should be. Everyone in Dealey Plaza who had their eyes focussed on the President the moment he was killed, the one thing they all described that was common was massive amount of exit debris leaving the back of his head and traveling to the rear. Everybody that watched the murder described that one thing. Their descriptions were different in other ways, but that was the one thing the descriptions had in common. You do not see any exit debris leaving the back of President Kennedy’s head and traveling to the rear in the Zapruder film. So if the car stop has been removed which it may have and if the, if the exit debris leaving the back of his head has been removed, I should say that they’re not present, so therefore I suspect they’ve been removed. I mean I know that the head wounds have been altered in the film, so I don’t necessarily trust the early conclusions of the research community if there’s a timing problem in the film, if time has been removed from the film by removing frames, to remove a car stop and to remove exit debris traveling in the wrong direction then the old argument about the timing problem it’s just suspect, and I submit to you that it’s no longer the primary evidence in the film of conspiracy. The primary evidence in the film, in the film of conspiracy is the alteration of the head wounds. That’s the big story now and that’s the new story that’s in my book. And...

JM: That’s true, and you know the thing that proves that to me is the testimony of not only the police officer Bobby Hargis who was riding to the immediate left rear of Kennedy but also witnesses who saw him that day and he was spattered with blood and brain matter, and he told, he told people that he was so hit with debris that he thought that he had been shot.

DH: That’s right he thought he had been shot, and both he and Martin both of them, to the left rear were covered with blood and gore, and so was the rear of the car, the trunk lid. So the listeners may be wondering why am I so certain that the film has been altered. The primary reason is because a patriot named Sydney Wilkinson, the lady in the film industry in Los Angeles, purchased from the National Archives a 35mm duplicate negative certified to be accurate, certified to be gold standard, the real deal, from the National Archives last year. She then assembled an ad hoc research group in Los Angeles - people from the motion picture industry. Nobody, Jim, had ever done that before. It’s remarkable that it took forty six years for someone to do this, but she did it, and…

JM: These people in the film industry, they had no real knowledge and no real particular concern about the Kennedy Assassination.

DH: They had no vested interest, they were not researchers who had staked out a claim for or against authenticity, they hadn’t written any books on the subject. Most of them hadn’t thought much about it in decades, but these are people that know motion picture films. They had no axe to grind. And Jim, seven out of seven people now that have viewed the digital scans that she made – she made high definition scans of each frame of the Zapruder film from her dupe negatives, Seven out of seven experts, now, experts in the post-production of pictures, people who know what special effects look like – Seven out of seven people that have viewed it now say that the film – the head wounds are not only altered, but they are badly altered. The alterations were very poorly done – and...

JM: They were probably done very hurriedly.

DH: Very hurriedly, in fact I know how hurriedly because the other part of the story proves that the chain of custody found wasn’t what we thought it was and instead of being sent directly to Life Magazine the day after the assassination like we thought it was for years, instead the film went to Washington DC to the CIA’s primary photo analysis facility, the NPIC, National Photographic Interpretation Center. And briefing boards were made Saturday night, the 23rd of November, ’63 from the original eight millimeter film. That’s what you would expect. The problem is, that the next night at the same facility – another Zapruder film was brought,– this is Sunday night, now, the Sunday night before the funeral – another Zapruder film was brought, 24 hours later to the NPIC and those controlling that evolution, brought in a whole different group of workers, not one single person who had been present the night before was present Sunday night, a different group of workers and the film presented was no longer an eight millimeter film it was sixteen millimeter wide double eight film, but it was as yet unslit. So this was an altered film, Jim, masquerading as a camera original. And the Agent that delivered it to the NPIC the second night for a second set of briefing boards to be made said it came from the CIA’s secret photo lab at Kodak headquarters in Rochester NY called Hawkeye Works. So that’s a heck of a story, that a second original film that was developed at a place where we know the original really was not developed. The original was developed in Dallas, Jim, and it was slit from eight millimeters on the day it was developed, so a second Zapruder film was brought to the CIA’s lab in Washington Sunday night, it’s double the width it should be - it’s masquerading as right out of the camera just developed in the wrong city, in Rochester. So what you have, I think, is an authentic set of briefing boards that what the film really showed, made Saturday night. And then you had a sanitized set of briefing boards made Sunday night in the same building by a different group of people sanitized group of briefing boards made from an altered film. And that’s a heck of a story so we have a...

JM: How difficult would it have been to take these, we say briefing boards, I’m assuming your talking about like, they could photograph each frame and blow it up to like an eight by ten, or whatever, they could then mess with it, how difficult would it be then to photograph each of those doctored frames and shoot ‘em frame by frame with the Zapruder – camera, and then be able to argue that it came from his camera and therefore it was in an authentic film.

DH: Yeah the alteration question is one that’s still being researched. The Hollywood experts - there were two ways, Jim, to do a visual effect in a motion picture in those days, of course we didn’t have any digital technology yet, so the two ways to do it were by traveling mattes or by aerial imaging. The people that believe the film was altered, the seven Hollywood experts who have seen it so far, they believe aerial imaging was probably the technique used, its much simpler than a traveling matte, and it’s my personal opinion after reading school text books from 1965, talking to these people in Hollywood is that it WAS possible, that’s my opinion. It was possible to alter the head wound images within one day using aerial imaging. Now if...

JM: Can you explain aerial imaging? What are we talking?

DH: Yeah, very simply I’d love to – if you take a film – Aerial imaging Jim, let me start over, Aerial imaging is done by - with a device called an optical printer. Optical printers are used to copy motion picture films by projecting the original image though a lens and then recording it in another camera. So optical printers are almost always customized and if the – many of them were customized by to handle aerial imaging. So in aerial imaging you had this big Rube Goldberg contraption about six feet tall, very heavy, bolted to the deck and you’re gonna project the original film from below, it bounces off a mirror at a forty five degree angle and comes straight up through the air through a condenser lens. On top of the condenser lens is a glass plate on which you can do animation, so if you are projecting an original film from below frame by frame it’s coming through condenser lens through a glass plate about seven and a half by ten inches. You have acetate frames laid on top of the glass plate. You do your artwork – you block out part of the head, and you paint on a false wound on each acetate frame and you re-photograph this composite image from above in a process camera. So you have a playback camera down below, the process camera up above. But the aerial imaging only requires one pass through the new camera so you retain a good visibility, good resolution, it doesn’t take as long that way and you don’t have registration problems because it’s self matting. Now that’s a little bit of inside baseball, but it’s all explained in Chapter Fourteen. So aerial imaging was, I believe was feasible to have been done within a twelve hour period providing you used a Bell and Howell eight millimeter home movie camera as the process camera and I believe that’s what happened...

JM: Yeah since they had the Zapruder camera then you could use that as the processing camera, right?

DH: Well it - Jim, I don’t recall sitting here right now, when the Government took the camera whether it was that weekend or a week or two later but, yes, as long as you had a Bell and Howell camera, well as long as you had one you were set.

JM: Okay.

DH: So if other things were altered in the film, if time was removed, by removing frames, if the car stop were removed if exit debris was removed coming out the back of the head, which I think it surely was, some of those things may have taken additional time but we do know that the first alterations were done by Sunday night because it’s the Sunday night version of the film from with the NPIC employees made their briefing boards, the second set of briefing boards. We know from examining a surviving briefing board from Sunday night that the blowups they made of the Zapruder frames are the same as the crude pictures in Life the next week – the black and white pictures published by Life the next week, so the initial set of alterations was done by Sunday night rather hurriedly, I do believe, and the pictures in Life that week and the pictures in the second set of briefing boards are identical, so it’s clear that all – many alterations probably the principle ones were done on Sunday, November 24th and I think that’s why they’re crude and their not well done and I think that’s why Life Magazine surpressed the film or the motion picture for twelve years...

JM: I wanted to point out that as far as the public is concerned no one actually got to see the Zapruder film run as a film for a dozen years.

DH: That’s right, it was only shown to the Warren Commission on a shakey movie screen, you know the old fashion movie screen with an eight millimeter projector – the original was looked at three or four times and the rest of the time the Warren Commission had to use a copy and Life Magazine after spending an extra hundred thousand dollars basically tripling the price to buy the second time. They bought it Saturday for fifty thousand for print rights only. They bought it two days later on Monday for a hundred fifty thousand, they paid an extra hundred thousand bucks in 1963 dollars for motion picture rights and they never once in twelve years displayed it as a motion picture for profit. Once the bootleg copy of the film was shown by Robert Groden and Geraldo Rivera and Dick Gregory on television in 1975, Life said forget it, and they sold it back to the family for one dollar. So, because the heat was on them at that point, is why did you surppress this, this back and to the left motion on the President’s body. So they said – Oh we don’t want anything more to do with this. But I believe that’s one of the main reasons it was suppressed for twelve years is because the alterations were so poorly done that if it had been loaned or used to show it as a motion picture that those using it and showing it may have detected the fraud.

JM: Exactly, let me add this quick, here’s a little coda, just a few days ago I received an email from a fellow who’s the nephew of a man who was an investigative reporter for Life Magazine and he was telling me how his uncle suspected conspiracy in the Kennedy Assassination and was trying to pursue that angle when he was called off, told to forget it by his immediate superior at Life Magazine who it turns out – and he was told - was a close friend of Clay Shaw. The man who was prosecuted by Jim Garrison. So we see the inner connections that were taking place at that time, which of course the public has never been privy too.

DH: Wow, you know, Jim, that’s amazing – I’m speechless...There’s one other thing I should point out about the film – I think the head explosion, the infamous head explosion in frame 313 is artwork. I don’t think it’s real. It only lasts for one frame that film was running at eight – over eighteen frames per second on the average. It was running two frames per second fast. A real head explosion would have registered on at least four or five frames of movie film. Maybe seven or eight frames – half a second. That explosion only lasts for one frame – it’s impossibly short and it actually – if you look at the scans made by the Hollywood group – it actually occurs – the explosion is centered forward of the President’s skull, actually outside of his head. So the artist that did that head explosion did a lousy job and they painted it in the wrong place on the frame. And it just doesn’t fly – that dog does not hunt, Jim.

JM: Just does not hunt. That’s amazing. Okay, we’re gonna take a short break and when we come back, Doug I’m gonna ask you – What do we do about all this now? We’ll be right back.

[ to 46:11 – commercial break]

46:49:

JM: Howdy, this is your host for today, Jim Marrs, we’ve been talking to Doug Horne, Chief Military Analyst for the Assassination Records Review Board who has just blown us away with his knowledge and his conclusions that the Kennedy Assassination was an inside job and that the most basic evidence the body, the Zapruder film has all been altered by elements within the Federal Government of the United States. Doug, where to we go from here?

DH: Well, there’s two possible avenues, I mean, the one is to do what we’ve always been doing, for people that are fascinated and sometimes even obsessed with this evidence to keep studying it and keep writing about it and that’s what I’m doing and the other...

JM: Tell us where we can get your book.

DH: Oh sure, you know I had to go the self publishing route because I wanted to publish a two thousand page book so my book is five volumes. But I don’t want people to be afraid of that, it’s very accessible, it’s written for the ordinary person, so you can get it only at Amazon.com and they’ll print it upon demand within one day or day and a half at the most of when you order it at Amazon.com. They’ll print it and it’ll be in the mail to you. And each volume is very reasonably priced. So you can buy one at a time, two at a time or all five. Just put in my last name Horne and word JFK – Horne JFK – HORNE JFK and all five volumes will pop up.

JM: That’s great. I’ve noticed already that there are the debunkers, the naysayers, yes even perhaps, the hired minions who are on the internet saying - Oh, well Doug Horne he’s just fantasizing and he’s just drawing bad conclusions and, yada yada – how would you respond to them?

DH: Well, no, I’m not a medical doctor, Jim. but I’ve been studying the case since 1966 when the first critical books came out and I had a man who’s an MD review the work, he did peer review of my book while I was writing it, learned a lot from him, I learned a lot from the five medical consultants hired by the review board staff during our – while we were in session during the 1990’s - and I had a board certified radiologist peer review my chapter on the x-rays, so I’m pretty confident that I am not blowing smoke. And I would invite anyone who isn’t sure or even someone who is skeptical. Read all the books. Read the Warren report, read the House Committee report and read my book and make up your own mind. Don’t fall into the trap of allowing someone else to characterize my work. Their goal is to get you not to read it. So make up your own mind. I believe that extraordinary crimes require extraordinary evidence. And I have provided the evidence. That’s why the evidence is five volumes, and eighteen hundred and eighty pages of text and ninety pages of illustrations. So people can decide for themselves whether I am qualified or not.

JM: Well, that’s certainly reasonable enough. At this point I – go ahead and give us your bottom line, so what are we talking about here, are we talking about coup d'état?

DH: Yeah, we are Jim, it’s not a pretty story, it’s an ugly story. I don’t think the Government will ever admit to this, because it’s just too unpleasant. And, unfortunately the people in succeeding administrations, they always seem to think the American people can’t handle the truth. In my view, what the American people cannot stomach the most is lies. I’ve pursued this case for decades because I hate being lied to. I just hate it with an intensity that I cannot describe. So I think people can handle the truth particularly forty six, forty seven years later and if we’re gonna understand our real history, you know, we need to come to grips with what really happened to JFK, and Martin Luther King, and Bobby Kennedy, and the nation hasn’t done that yet, you know, as a whole. So, yeah I believe we had a coup d'état. And I believe it was over the....go ahead, Jim...

JM: We’ve kind of been all in the state of denial, haven’t we?

DH: We ARE a nation in denial. We’re a nation that’s a little bit naive, we should be ashamed of ourselves, so if we’re more interested in our mythology, about ourselves in believing in our mythology, about us being the greatest democracy on earth and, you know, bad things don’t happen in our country, they only happen in other countries. That mindset is one I cannot tolerate, after having studied all this evidence. This evidence, the evidence, everything is wrong with this case, it’s what drove me to conclude there was a coup. I didn’t start in 1967 with the conclusion there was a coup, and I’m gonna go cherry pick the evidence that said there was. It was the other way around, the evidence drove me toward my political conclusion which I reached about ten years ago. And this coup d'état in America, Jim, occurred at the height of the cold war and it was engineered by a consensus, I hate to say this, a wide consensus of people in the national security establishment within the Pentagon and the intelligence agencies, that President Kennedy was weak on foreign policy, they thought he was dangerous, and that they were very upset that he wanted to end the cold war and not win it. To these people, winning the cold war not only meant winning the space race or the peace race, it meant winning hot wars, like Viet Nam, Laos, Cuba. It also meant possibly even nuking the Soviet Union, a first strike, preemptive first strike against the Soviet Union. This was the mindset that was confronting JFK, who these people viewed President Kennedy by the third year of his administration as a very dangerous change agent...

JM:...and if he had ended the cold war, not only just think about the the billions and billions of dollars in defense that they would not have made...

DH: Okay, you’re not a kidding, so the – I view the the intelligence cold warriors and the high level people in the Pentagon who all opposed him, so vociferously to his face, quite often, who opposed him as Jihadists. They were our holy warriors of that time who wanted to defeat Communism on the battlefield. I mean, a cold war wasn’t good enough for these people. They wanted victories on the battlefield because of the frustrating stalemate in Korea in 1953. And when they realized he wasn’t going to give it to them in Laos, he wasn’t going to give it to them in Viet Nam, and he wasn’t even going to invade Cuba. These people were absolutely fit to be tied and when he began, you know, to formally try to end the cold war in 1963 with the Peace Speech, in June ’63 and the successful sponsorship of the Test Ban Treaty and getting that through the Senate at the end of that summer. That was it, I mean, and the final straw was probably the fact that he was negotiating back channel with Castro to try to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba, providing the Russians would leave, so they did not want to see this man reelected.

JM: Right. Okay, look Doug, let me ask you this – do you feel like those same forces, maybe not the exact same people, but their families, the power groups, the financiers, the bankers, behind them, their minions, are they still in power today?

DH: The same mindset is certainly in power, the mindset that, the simplistic mindset that says the best solutions are military solutions. I don’t believe that myself, but there are people around as we know, from studying the last decade, that the Neocons certainly believed that. And they’re still around, they’re waiting to take power again, as soon as Obama leaves office, so, yeah, that mindset is still with us, that military solutions are the best ones, and that we want to – we not only, this – people with this mindset don’t really care whether people like us or not. They want people to fear this nation. And of course, they have plenty of support from all the corporate interests who want to continue to make money hand over fist from money pissed away on arms programs.

JM:Right. And the occupation of other key countries that may be sitting on oil deposits or gas pipelines or even the poppy fields. Right?

DH: Yeah, that’s right.

JM: Amazing. All right, Doug Horne. Thank you so much, this has been extremely enlightening discussion and I personally appreciate what you’re saying. As far as I know you are one of the first government officials who is seen the inside information and who’s come out with the courage to say, Hey, this is an inside job, this was a coup d'état which of course fits all the known facts. I certainly appreciate that, particularly myself because, of course, you know, going back to, oh I think I published an article in 1975 that said that said this is a coup d'état and of course I was the conspiracy theorist. But it turns out that the conspiracy theorists were more right than wrong.

DH: They certainly have been, and I – in the 60’s Mark Lane, and Josiah Thompson blazed the trail and and they were followed by, you know, along with Jim Garrison, and they were followed by you, and David Lifton, and many others, and I’m standing on the shoulders of you people. So, we have to keep fighting the good fight, Jim.

JM: Well, truth will out, and I’m like you, I haven’t been in it because I had any preconceived ideas. I’ve been at the Kennedy Assassination because from the gitgo because I realized something was not right about all that and all I wanted was the truth and I submit and I reinforce and I reiterate what you said which is – Don’t believe us, just study the facts, and study the material, come to your own conclusions.

DH: Right.

JM: Doug, thank you so much, I appreciate you being with us today and this is your Dreamland sporadic host, Jim Marrs saying – Adios.

[ To 57:11 ] [ announcer tag to end – 57:36 ]

Transcribed and made available by Jerry Ellis.

Thanks JE

BK

Building 213 Washington Navy Yard

 

Building 213 Washington Navy Yard - NPIC - from January 1, 1963

A Visit Inside Building 213

http://www.spyteacher.com/index_4.htm

...“Paul, what do you plan to do when you get out of the Marine Corps?” he asked.

“I really have no idea, sir,” I replied. “The only thing I do know is that I’m not going back to Niagara Falls and work in a factory like my father and uncles.”

“Ever thought about working for the CIA?” was his next question. That one hit me like a bolt of lightening out of the blue.

“The CIA?” I asked incredulously as I tried to look up at him while shielding the sun from my eyes with my hand.

“I think you’d like working for the Agency,” he continued. “Why don’t you go down to their employment office and fill out an application? Put my name down as a reference.”

Uncle George handed me a business card printed with his name and walked back to shore for another load of boards. The card displayed nothing more than his name; no American eagle, no 007, no CIA. I tucked the card into my hip pocket and started thinking about what I could possibly do for the Central Intelligence Agency as I continued to drive more nails into more boards on that hot August afternoon.

We talked about a lot of things at dinner that evening, but never once was the CIA mentioned. I later found out that even Sheri did not know uncle George was going to suggest the Agency to me, nor could she shed any light on what he did for them.

The following week, with a day pass from my first sergeant and a friend’s car, I drove the 35 miles from Quantico to 1016 16th Street, NW in Washington, DC. The building looked no different from any of the other office buildings on that street. I double-checked the address before entering the lobby where a young lady at the reception desk asked me for my driver’s license and handed me a short “Visitor” form to fill out. Name, address, and social security number were all I had to write. At the bottom of the form were places for a personal reference and my signature.

I filled out the form, copied down uncle George’s name, scribbled my signature, and handed the form back to the receptionist. She then asked me to take a seat in the waiting area. About 20 minutes later, a gentlemen in a nicely tailored suit approached and invited me back to his office.

I was trying to anticipate how to react to my first interview by a CIA recruiter but was unprepared for what happened next. He asked me only two questions, “How are you this morning, Mr. Grassler?” and “Can you get to 1st and M streets by 10:30?”

“I think we have a position you will find interesting,” he continued as he pointed out a building on a map of the Washington Navy Yard in southeast DC. The number of the building was 213.

He gave me directions, tracing a route on the map with his finger. He then stood up, shook my hand, and wished me luck with my next interview. As I Walked out of his office, somewhat bewildered by the brevity of the process, I couldn’t help but wonder who uncle George really was.

I made it to the corner of 1st and M with time to spare. Building 213 was a white, six-story concrete building with all of its windows bricked in except for a row of dark-tinted windows on the top floor.

There was a parking lot in front and the entire facility was surrounded by a 10-foot high chain-link fence topped with three strands of barbed wire. There were no signs or logos on the property except for the number 213. The building drew no more attention than that of a warehouse.

At the 1st-street entrance, a uniformed officer standing next to a guard booth asked me for my driver’s license. He went into the booth, made a phone call and, within two minutes, handed back my license, gave me a visitor’s parking pass for my windshield, and pointed out the parking space I was to use. He instructed me to see the receptionist at the front desk in the lobby.

The lobby in Building 213 was nothing to write home about. White and sterile would be an adequate description. There was a long desk to the left of the lobby where two uniformed guards were checking the identification badges of people entering and leaving the building. Everyone was wearing a picture badge except me. To the right of the lobby was another long desk, and this one with two women behind it. The sign on the desk read, “Reception”.

I handed one of the women my driver’s license and she asked me to fill out a short form identical to the one I had filled out at the recruitment office. Upon handing back the form, she presented me with my first government badge. I didn’t think it would have allowed me access to anything much more than the mens’ room. The plain white badge was emblazoned with a large red “V”. I soon learned that I was now an official “uncleared visitor”.

With my new badge clipped to my pocket I waited in the lobby while the receptionist made a phone call. In less than five minutes, I was being escorted by another man in a well-tailored suit to a small interview room adjacent to the lobby.

For the next 45 minutes I was “filled in” on the position I was being offered and on the process I would go through to get my clearances. The process could take up to a year, and after seeing the stack of forms I was given to fill out, I calculated that six months of that time would be dedicated to writing. The gentleman quipped that when the weight of the paper work equaled my body weight I would have my final clearances. The longest form was the Personal History Statement. I, my neighbors, and friends would soon discover that the CIA wanted to know everything about me.

As for the job, I knew little more than when I first entered building 213. I was to be a records control clerk with a GS-4 pay grade. For those not familiar with the GS government pay scale, a GS-4’s salary hovers just above the poverty line in Washington, DC. That was about it. Information about what records I would control and for whom was never offered.

Fourteen months later I received my letter of acceptance. One month after my discharge from the Marine Corps I was gainfully employed by the CIA.

The beginning of my career in the federal government was the beginning of a series of adventures few people in any occupation could ever imagine. As an artist, the experiences were even more unique and exciting.

It took a stranger’s name and about 90 minutes for an artist and Marine from Niagara Falls to get a job with the CIA. I have never been hired faster nor have I ever had to wait longer to begin my first day of work. I have never had a better time nor received a better salary. Interestingly, this would be the first of three times I
would work for the CIA. For me, three really was charm!

to be continued...

Steuart's Garage DC

 

Steuart's Garage - Washington DC Circa 1920

Later home to the NPIC

The Journal of Military History Volume 69, Number 4, October 2005Warren, Mame.
Focal Point of the Fleet: U.S. Navy Photographic Activities in World War II
The Journal of Military History - Volume 69, Number 4, October 2005, pp. 1045-1079

Society for Military History

Washington, D.C., was the headquarters of most U.S. Navy photographic activities during World War II. Continuing a distinguished history of naval photography, hundreds of cameramen, including Edward Steichen and his team of professional photographers, fanned out from Washington to document both the European and Pacific theaters. They shot millions of still and motion pictures, and sent them back to various facilities, especially the Naval Photographic Science Laboratory at Anacostia. There, hundreds of men and women worked around the clock to generate images that would inspire both their military commanders and the American people with the prowess of the U.S. Navy in warfare.

Arthur C. Lundahl was the head of the Navy photo laboratory that originally analyzed the Utah Pictures (Newhouse film), supervised the analysis work. When the CIA formed their National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), Lundahl became head of it and remained in that position until retirement. NPIC are the ones who detected the Russian missiles in Cuba. I've never seen a full biography on him, but recall that his photoanalysis experience went back to World War II, and he told us some stories about that. - Richard Hall

Robertson Panel – The Durant Report –
January 14-18, 1953

http://www.cufon.org/cufon/robert.htm

The first day, the panel viewed two amateur motion pictures of UFOs: the Mariana UFO Incident footage and 1952 Utah UFO Film (the latter was taken by Navy Chief Petty Officer Delbert C. Newhouse, who had extensive experience with aerial photography). Two Navy photograph and film analysts (Lieutenants R.S. Neasham and Harry Woo) then reported their conclusions: based on more than 1,000 man hours of detailed analysis, the two films depicted objects that were not any known aircraft, creature or weather phenomena.

http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:33Y45PtrcykJ:en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robertson_Panel+Robertson+Panel+Report+Harry+Woo&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

http://www.nicap.org/waves/1953_robertson_panel.htm

(Note: Brad Sparks was the only researcher ever to interview Woo, who died in 1976. Woo had joined the CIA, in its highly secret Technical Services Division of the Clandestine Service working on spy cameras, several months after the Robertson Panel. Woo was still angry decades later at how the Panel scientists mistreated him and he praised Hynek for "sticking up" for him.)

http://ncas.org/condon/text/appndx-u.htm - tabb

http://www.eyepod.org/WTZ-2.html

A formerly SECRET report released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) shows that CIA officials and consultants thought people seeing and reporting UFOs was more dangerous than UFOs themselves, stating, "the continued emphasis on the reporting of these phenomena [UFOs] does, in these perilous times, result in a threat to the orderly functioning of the protective organs of the body politic.

" Another 'danger' cited by the CIA panel was that acknowledging UFOs could results in "...the cultivation of a morbid national psychology in which hostile propaganda could induce hysterical behavior and a harmful distrust of duly constituted authority."

To counter these supposed dangers, the CIA panel recommended a policy of "debunking" and education designed to persuade people that what they were seeing really wasn't there.

In explaining how this psychological warfare against the American people should be carried out, the report stated:

"The debunking aim would result in reduction of public interest in 'flying saucers' which today evokes a strong psychological reaction. This education could be accomplished by mass media such as television, motion pictures and popular articles"

The panel had further ideas on how what was essentially a disinformation program should be mounted, stating: "It was felt strongly that psychologists familiar with mass psychology should advise on the nature and extent of the program." The report went on to name certain psychologists who might be recruited to join the debunking project.

The formation of the CIA panel came about as a sort of compromise worked out by the National Security Council (NSC) after events in the summer of 1952. A major UFO flap had taken place across the country, highlighted by puzzling incidents in July 1952, when UFO intruders were simultaneously tracked on ground radar and observed by jet interceptor pilots over the nation's capital, Washington, DC. The public, the press, and even President Harry Truman demanded to know what was going on. As a result, the US Air Force held a major press conference on July 29, 1952, the largest press conference since WW II, at which it was suggested the UFOs were temperature inversions--layers of warm air trapped under cold air that, by some giant stretch of the Air Force's imagination, were tracked on radar and seen as maneuvering flying craft by pilots sent aloft on scramble alert.

In August 1952, as documents released as the result of the FOIA suit filed by the author confirm, the CIA began reviewing the Air Force's handling of UFOs. Ransom Eng, an official with the CIA's office of Scientific Intelligence, wrote a report in which he characterized the Air Force's efforts as "scientifically invalid."

Armed with these criticisms, the CIA wanted to take charge of UFO intelligence [the collection and analysis of UFO evidence], and proposed, through CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith, that UFOs were much too serious of a matter to be left in the hands of the USAF. The National Security Council, however, would only approve a compromise where by a CIA-appointed panel would review UFO reports provided by the Air Force to determine if UFOs were a "direct, hostile threat to national security."

The struggle for power and funding between the U.S. Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency had been on-going since 1947, the year the CIA was officially created and the Air Force became a separate service branch [after being part of the Army previously]. It would continue for decades thereafter throughout the Cold War with the Soviet Union, and include highly exaggerated Air Force Intelligence claims of Soviet bomber and missile superiority and 'first-strike' civil defense preparations, even though in 1955 the CIA gained somewhat of an upper hand with the development and covert deployment of the U-2 high altitude spy plane--at least in the sense of getting the President's ear.

In January 1953 the CIA's Robertson Panel, mostly consulting scientists of the CIA's chosen to review the UFO evidence selected by the USAF, rejected the conclusions of the U.S. government's top photo analysts from the Naval Photographic Interpretation Center (NAVPIC), Anacostia, MD, Capt. Arthur Lundahl and Lt. Robert Neasham, who had concluded the objects in two 8mm UFO films submitted to the Air Force and examined by the CIA Panel were extraterrestrial spacecraft. Both men were reportedly emotionally shattered by the Panel's rejection of their studied conclusions.


But within a matter of days Lundahl and Neasham were invited by the CIA to resign their Navy officers' commissions and come over to the CIA as civilians and establish the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) at 5th & K Streets in Washington,DC, with Lundahl serving as the founding Director for the next twenty years and Neasham as his top assistant. In 1954 Lundahl was informed the CIA would begin flying high altitude reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Untion and Soviet Bloc [and China] the following year. Lundahl therefore went out an acquired the world's best computer, a large Swiss-built machine, and set out developing computer-enhanced photo analysis in order to extract intelligence from photos taken from 100,000 feet up.

The mastermind of what was to become the U.S. government's UFO policy and author of the CIA's Robertson Panel Report, which found that UFOs did not pose "a direct, hostile threat to National Security," was Fred Durant, an officer with the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) who at the time was operating under the cover of being a civilian scientist employed by the Arthur Little Co....

Copyright (c) 2005 by W. Todd Zechel
P.O. Box 117
Prairie du Sac, WI 53578-0117
next in "Close Encounters of the Government Kind pt3"
"The CIA Takes Control"

ExCom Meeting October 1962

 

http://www.jfklancer.com/cuba/links/ExComm meeting Oct 18.pdf

ExCom meeting, October 18, 1962
The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
Executive Committee Meeting Excerpts
The Oval Office

Participants:

George Ball under secretary of state
McGeorge Bundy assistant to the president for national security
C. Douglas Dillon secretary of the Treasury
Lyndon B. Johnson vice president
John F. Kennedy president
Robert F. Kennedy attorney general
Arthur Lundahl director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
Gen. Maxwell Taylor chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
John McCone director, Central Intelligence Agency
Robert McNamara secretary of defense
Dean Rusk secretary of state
Llewellyn Thompson ambassador-at-large and
special adviser on Soviet affairs and
other unidentified participants

October 18, 1962, 11 a.m.

[The committee is discussing aerial reconnaissance photos of Cuba]

Arthur Lundahl: Yes sir. Mr. President, gentlemen, the first and most important item which I would seek to call to your attention is a new area hitherto never seen by us some 21 miles to the southwest of Havana which we have at the moment labeled a probable MRBM/IRBM launch complex. The name of the town nearest is this, it is there. The two sites, sir, Nos. 1 and 2, are 2 1/2 miles apart and enlarging this one we look at it and we see for the first time a pattern of Medium/IRBM sites that looks like the things we have been seeing in the Soviet Union. There are two pads here and here. They are separated by 750 feet. There's a control bunker with cable scars going up to small buildings in board at each of these pads. There is no equipment on the pads yet, they're under construction. The security fence has been superimposed around the place.

And on 29 August, the last time we went over this area the ground had just scarcely started to be scratched.

[Further discussion of sights]

We've never identified as irrevocably the signature of a Soviet intermediate medium range ballistic missile, which is estimatedly a 2,000 mile missile. But the elongation of the pads and the location of the control bunkers between each pair of pads has been the thing that has suggested to our hearts, if not our minds, the kind of thing that might accompany an IRBM. So we have, at the moment, labeled it as such and let the guided missile intelligence analysts come up, finally, with the true analysis of what the range of these missiles might be that are eventually accommodated on this set of pads. Let me switch to the next material[?] ... [unintelligible] ... Yes sir.

[Further discussion of sights]

Also earlier, Mr. President, we reported to you a number of what we call cruise missile sites, that's short range coastal defense type missiles. Starting out with the Banes site, with another one located at Santa Cruz del Norte, up here in the Havana area. At the time of that reporting, there were 2 launchers at this position here and here. Since the coverage of that day, 2 more launching positions have been added upward/up north[?] of those 2 positions. The launcher here is uncovered, you can actually see the launcher itself. And down in this small indentment[?] here
appears to be the winged type of air breathing[?] missile which will go on it. The short, stubby winged fellow which conforms to the cruise type of missile that we have seen before. So, our opinion of this thing remains the same, we now would just report two additional launching positions at that complex.

[Discussion of airfields]

John Kennedy: So in other words, from the information we have prior to the development of these new films, you'd say there are how many, ah, different, ah, missile sites, as well as how many different launch pads at each site?

Arthur Lundahl: Well sir, we had not found anything like the MRBM sites in any of the photography up to this l5 October bit. We had found and added to it last night 1 more surface-to-air missile site, so that made a total of 23, as of this location. However, one of them has been pulled up and moved away, at Santa Lucia. We don't know where they pull these things up and move them to, but we have seen 23 surface-to-air missile sites. We've seen 3 of these surface to surface cruise type of missile sites at Banes and up here, we're at del Norte and then down on the Isle of Pines.

[Further discussion of photos]

John McCone?: The uh, the Joint Committee made an estimate that between 16 and 32 missiles would be operational within a week or slightly more. This is an estimate, a ... [unintelligible] ... estimate.

[Further discussion of photos]

Dean Rusk: ... [unintelligible] ... First of all the question that needs an answer really is, is it necessary to take action? And I suppose that there is probable reason to take action here. But the points are taken it looks now as if Cuba is not going to be just an instrumental base for fielding these things, but bases are going to pop out like measles all over the world. It might be an island in ... [unintelligible] ... Cuba could become just part of the goal, a military problem, and any contest we would have with Soviet Union could[?] get tense any other part of the world, and I think our colleagues in Defense will comment on that very carefully, because that's[?] a very important point. But, I do think when the full scope of this becomes known that no action would undermine our alliances all over the world, very promptly.

[Speaks on the effect of no action]

I think also we have to think of the effect on the Soviets, if you would do that. Now suppose that they would consider this a major back down and that this would free their hands for almost any type of adventure they might want to try out in other parts of the world. If we are unable to face up to the situation in Cuba against this kind of threat then I think they would be greatly encouraged to go adventuring, and would feel they've got it made as far as the ... [unintelligible]
... of the United States. They all know that we have an almost unmanageable problem in this country getting any support for foreign policy that we would need to pursue, if we're going sustain[?] the cause of independence and faith[?] here and in all parts of the world. We've got a million men in uniform outside of the United States, we've got fine programs, we've got a major [cough] major effort we're making in agriculture. It seems to that inaction, in this situation would
undermine and undercut the long support we need for the kind of foreign policy that will eventually ensure our survival.

Now action involves very high risks indeed. I think that additional information increases the risk because challenge is much more serious and the, uh, counter action I would suppose would have to be heavier ... [unintelligible] ... talking about. But, we in fact, but, uh, you would have to have in the back of your own mind, whatever decision you take, the, uh, possibility or/not[?] the likelihood
of a Soviet reaction somewhere else running all the way from Berlin right around to Korea and the possibility of a reaction against the United States itself. Don't think that you can make this decision under the assumption that this is a free ride or easier in any ... [unintelligible] ... I would suppose that with the first missiles you're talking about that a quick strike, a quick success a matter of a couple of hours time, 50 or 60 Soviet missiles ... [unintelligible]... where it is obvious then the matter is over and finished and that was the purpose of our engagement. That would have much more reduced threats from a military response on the other side. ... [unintelligible] ... these other installations and getting involved in various parts of the island, I think would increase the risk of a military response down there.

The action also has to be thought of in connection with alliance solidarity, there we're faced with conflicting elements. Unless we're in a situation where it is clear that the alliance has worked to understand the problem, then unannounced, unconsulted quick action on our part, could well lead to a kind of odd disunitiveness the Soviets could capitalize upon very strongly. Um, it's one thing
for Britain and France get themselves isolated within the alliance over Suez. But it's quite another thing for the alliance for the United States to get itself in the same position, because we are the central bone structure of the alliance and this is a different kind of problem that we have to think very hard about. Now I think that, as far as I am concerned I would have to say to you if we enter upon this path of challenging the Soviets what the Soviets do themselves have to embark[?] tactically dangerous course that no one surely can foresee the outcome. I was prepared to say
when I came over here before I got this information ... [unintelligible] ... Soviet strike. Very probably, a move by ... [unintelligible] ... much more general action I think, as far as Cuba is concerned and possibly in other situations
Now there is another ... [unintelligible] ... I think the American people will willingly undertake great danger, if necessary for something. If they have a deep feeling that you've done everything that is reasonably possible to determine whether or not this trip[?] was necessary. Also that they have clear conscience and a good theory of the case. The first point, whether this trip[?] is necessary,
we all of course, remember the Guns of August. We're certainly convinced of the general situation.

We've got the time now that we've gotten ... [unintelligible] ... and this, this question I think is something that's pretty important. A matter of a clear conscience, in World War II, the Pearl Harbor attack against the background of Hitler's conduct ... [unintelligible] ... In the case in Korea, we had an organized, large-scale aggression from North Korea and we were going in as part of the
general United Nations effort. Even with that start the Korean aspect of it ... [unintelligible] ... general support of the American people before it was over.
Now, these are considerations I'm just mentioning ... [unintelligible] ... put military in favor of a, uh, a confrontation with Khrushchev, and the implication because the ... [unintelligible] ... possibility, only a possibility Khrushchev might realize that he's got to back down. We can't be, we have no reason to expect that, as far as we're concerned. It looks very serious nature of on his part. but at least it would take that point out of the way for the historical record and just might plant the seeds of prevention of a great conflict.

[Discussion of the possibility of declaring war on Cuba]

Dean Rusk: I'd like to hear my colleague comment on this, whether the, uh, the actual action we would take, that you have to. No one can guarantee that this can be achieved by diplomatic action, but it seems to be essential that this be challenged and be tested out before military action is employed. And if our decision is firm, and it must be, I can see no danger in communication with Khrushchev privately, worded in such a way that he realizes that we mean business. This I consider an essential first step, no matter what military course ... [unintelligible ]
... we determine on, if he replies unsatisfactorily. If the tone and tenor of his reply ... [unintelligible] ... I don't believe the threat of general nuclear war should be ... [unintelligible] ... sole reactive, even if the strike should come first. My chief concern about a strike without a diplomatic effort that it would eventually, that it would immediately lead to war with Cuba and would not be the neat, quick disposal of the bases as was suggested. Furthermore I'm reasonably
certain the allied reaction would be very hostile. Especially if the Soviets retaliate locally and take the area beyond Berlin. Communication with Khrushchev would be useful for the record in establishing the record in our case for action. In general, I feel that a declaration of war would be valuable since it would open up every avenue of military action, air strikes, invasion, blockade. But
we would have to make a case to our allies to justify such a declaration of war.

[Speaks on the possibility of limited action.]

Maxwell Taylor: Mr. President ... [unintelligible] ... There are a series of alternative plans, (papers shuffling) ranging from Roman numeral 1 of about 50 sorties directed against solely against the known MRBMs, known as of last night, to Roman numeral 5, which covers the alternative invasion plans. All of these plans are based on one very important assumption. That we would attack with conventional weapons against an enemy who is not equipped with operational nuclear weapons. If
there is any possibility that the enemy is equipped with operational nuclear weapons, I'm certain the plans would have to be changed. Last evening we were discussing the relative merits of these forms of military action, assuming that at some point military action was required. It has been the views of the Chiefs, based on discussions within the last two days, and it was certainly my view,
that either Roman numeral 1 or Roman numeral 2, very limited air strikes against very limited targets, would be quite inconclusive, very risky, and almost certainly lead to further military action, prior to which we would have paid an unnecessary price for the gains we achieved.

[Discussion on military tactics]

John Kennedy: Why do you change, why does this information change the recommendation?
Maxwell Taylor: Last evening, it was my personal belief that there were more targets than we knew of, and that it was probable that there would be more targets than we could know of at the start of any one of these strikes. The information of this morning I think simply demonstrates the validity of that conclusion of last evening. Secondly, when we're talking of Roman numeral 1 as a very limited strike against MRBMs only and it leaves in existence IL28s with nuclear weapon carrying
capabilities and a number of other aircraft with nuclear weapon-carrying capability and aircraft with strike capability, which could be exercised during our attack or at any time following our attack on the MRBMs, with great possible risk and loss to either Guantanamo and or the eastern coast of the U.S. I say great loss, I'm not thinking in terms of tens of thousands, but I'm thinking terms of sporadic attacks against our civilian population, which would lead to losses I think we would find it hard to justify in relation to the alternative courses open to us and in relation to
the very limited accomplishment of our limited number of strikes.

John Kennedy: What about alternative No. 2 on the basis that you're going against offensive weapons, you're going to go against their missiles and you're going to go against their planes, what is the argument against that? I mean, that would prevent them knocking our population.

Maxwell Taylor: It's much to be preferred over No. l in my opinion. It would have to be larger than shown now because of the additional number of targets required and it fits very closely, to alternative 3 in terms of the number of sorties. No. 2 was prepared before we had the additional information of last night. Tonight's interpretation we showed 100 sorties. I think it more likely that No. 2, that the information we now have and the information we're likely to have ... [unintelligible]
... tomorrow merge with/into[?] version No. 3 which is a 200 sortie strike. I doubt very much we could stop there.

Dean Rusk: I would agree with that particular scenario[?], that really 2 is hardly possible now. I mean we're really talking 3 right now. So you'll have to take the sandbags out. If you're going to go for all these from the air, from the airfield strikes, ... [unintelligible] ... other target related ...
[unintelligible] ...

[Further discussion on military tactics]

John Kennedy: Well under 2 you don't need to take up the SAM sites before they become
operational.

Unidentified voice: Uh, they may be operational at any time.

Robert McNamara: We have almost certainly added two more targets than are indicated here. There are 16 targets shown, we have at least three more targets ... [unintelligible] ... since last night and we will certainly have some more tonight and tomorrow and therefore because 2 merges very directly into 3 if the SAM sites becomes operational 2 becomes 3 because in a very real sense they ... [several voices, unintelligible] ...

John Kennedy: Let me ask you this Bob, when we're talking about 3 vs. 5.

Robert McNamara: Yes sir.

John Kennedy: Uh, then the advantage of 3 is that you would hope to do it in a day?

Robert McNamara: Yes, it could be done in a day.

John Kennedy: And an invasion, 5, would be 7 or 8 or 9 days with all the consequences?

Robert McNamara: That is correct.

John Kennedy: We increase the tension now. If we did 3 would, uh, we would assume that by the end of the day their ability to use planes against this, after all they don't have that much range so they'd have to come back to the field and organize, right?

Robert McNamara: You would assume that by the end of the day their air force could be nearly destroyed, I say nearly because there might be a few sporadic weapons around.

Unidentified voice: Yes I would ... [unintelligible] ... we'll never be guaranteed a 100 percent. ... [unintelligible] ...

John Kennedy: Well, at least as far as their except of nuclear. I would think you have to go under the assumption that they're not going to permit nuclear weapons to be used against the United States from Cuba unless they're going to be using them from every place.

Robert McNamara: Well, maybe. I'm not sure they can stop it. This is why I emphasize a point here, that I don't believe the Soviets would authorize their use against the U.S. but they might nonetheless be used. Therefore, I underline his assumptions that all of these cases are premised on the assumptions there are no operational nuclear weapons there. If there's any possibility of that I would strongly recommend that these plans be modified substantially.

[Further discussion on military tactics]

John Kennedy: Holding the alliance, which is going to strain the alliance more, this tack by us on these, uh, Cuba. Which is, most allies regard as a fixation of the United States and not a seriousmilitary threat. I mean you have to apply conditional tactical ... [unintelligible] ... before they would accept or support our action against Cuba because they think that we're slightly demented on this subject. So there isn't any doubt that whatever action we take against Cuba, no matter how good
our films are, that will cause Latin America, and a lot of, a lot of people would regard this as a mad act by the United States which is due to a loss of nerve because they will argue that taken at its worst the presence of these missiles really doesn't change the verdict, if you think that ... [unintelligible] ... Well the Senate will think the other way ... [unintelligible] ... what is anybody else
going to think who isn't under this gun?

[Further discussion on military tactics]

John Kennedy: If we gave say this 24-hour notice, get in touch with Khrushchev, taking no action with our allies. I would assume that they would move these mobile missiles into the woods.

[Several voices]

Robert McNamara: Mr. President, I don't believe they're equipped to do that. I say that because if they were equipped to do that they would have been equipped to erect them more quickly. I think it is unlikely they would move them in 24 hours. If they were to move them in 24 hours I think we could keep enough reconnaissance over the island during that period to have some idea of where they've moved. Have every reason to believe we'd know where they were.

Unidentified voice: It would take a little longer though.

Robert McNamara: What?

Unidentified voice: It would take a little longer, to take very careful reconnaissance to know where they are.

Robert Kennedy: I'm not so confident that they couldn't hide them or get them in immediate readiness in 24 hours.

Robert McNamara: I didn't say they could get them in immediate readiness in 24 hours, I don't believe that they, we would lose them with a 24-hour discussion with Khrushchev.

John Kennedy: How quick is our communication with Moscow? Say we sent
somebody to see him and he was there at the beginning of the 24-hour period
to see Mr. Khrushchev, how long would it be before Khruschev's answer could
get back to us as far as communications?

Llewellyn Thompson?: It would have to go in code probably, what, probably five
or six hours. ... [unintelligible] ... You could telephone of course.

Robert Kennedy: Wouldn't really have to go in code, would it?

Llewellyn Thompson?: You could save time by not putting it in a highly
confidential ... [unintelligible] ... machine?

John Kennedy: Then it would be a couple of hours?

McGeorge Bundy?: Put it this way, it might be answered ...[unintelligible ]...
infinite delays on their end ... [unintelligible ] ...an actual text could be in here
and transmitted and that would get to Khrushchev straight away. Whereas,
somebody else might have the problem of ... [unintelligible ] ...

Dean Rusk?: I think there is one point we have to bear in mind. [unintelligible]
... So far we know there is no stated relationship that makes these Soviet
missiles or Soviet bases. There is the attempts that Castro made to ally himself
with the Warsaw Pact or join the Warsaw Pact or even to engage in a bilateral
with Moscow, apparently he ... [unintelligible] ... and failed. He sent Raul and
Che Guevara to Moscow a few months ago apparently for that purpose, other
purposes. Hence, if we were to take action with the present status, the Soviets
would have some latitude and might want to respond, if they did at all. On the
other hand, as a result of warning or communication with them, they declare
these their bases. Then we would have a different kind of problem. Because we
would have a problem of committing action against a stated base there. And
this might mean a war of different proportions.

John Kennedy: The question is really whether the Soviet reaction [and Cuban
resistance?] would be majorly different if they were presented with an
accomplished fact in the daytime, I mean one day, not the invasion ...
[unintelligible ... accomplished fact whether their reaction would be different
than it would be if they were given a chance to pull 'em out. If we said to
Khrushchev that we, we had to take action against it ... [unintelligible] ... pull
'em out and we'll take ours out of Turkey, whether that, whether he would then
send back: "If you take these out we're going to take Berlin, and we're going to
do something else."

Robert McNamara?: The important factor there is that if you do this first strike
you would kill a lot of Russians. That's ... [unintelligible] .. . On the other hand,
if you give them notice, the thing I would fear the most is if just Turkey and
Italy to take action to cause us to ... [unintelligible] ...
Unidentified voice: You mean if ...

Robert Kennedy: [interrupting] What is your preference Tom?

Llewellyn Thompson: My preference is let's blockade the ... [unintelligible] ...
the declaration has already led the steps leading up to it [?]. I think it's very
highly doubtful the Russians would resist a blockade against military weapons,
particularly offensive ones, if at that point if that's the way we pitched it to
the world.

John Kennedy: And what do we do with the weapons already there?

Llewellyn Thompson: Demand their dismantlement and say that we are going to
maintain constant surveillance, and if they are armed, we would then take them
out, and then maybe do it. I think we should be under no illusions that this
would probably in the end lead to the same thing. But we would do it under an
entirely different posture and background, and much less danger of getting up
into the big war.

The Russians have a curious faculty of wanting a legal basis, despite of all the
outrageous things they've done, they attach a lot of importance to this. The
fact that you have that declaration of war, they would be running a military
blockade, legally established, greatly deterred.[?]

John Kennedy: In other words ...

Robert Kennedy: [interrupting] If you maybe run through, because he hasn't
heard the explanation of the blockade.

Llewellyn Thompson: There is a paper there on that, force number 2, there, Mr.
President.... [unintelligible] ... It's a concept ... [much rustling of papers] ...
John Kennedy: In other words, under this, take these missiles that are now bad
out or the planes that are now bad out.

Llewellyn Thompson: Not at the first stage, I think it would be useful to say if
they're made operational, we might or would ...

John Kennedy: Of course then he would say, if you do that, then we will ...
Unidentified voice: Bomb 'em.

Llewellyn Thompson: As Chip says, I agree with you, if they're prepared to say,
if you do this, then this is nuclear world war, then you do that anyway. I think
he'd make a lot of threatening language, but in very big terms, keeping ...
John Kennedy: [interrupting] I would think it's just more likely he would grab
Berlin, that's more likely.

Unidentified voice: I think that already ...

Llewellyn Thompson: [interrupting] If we just made the first strike I think his
answer would be, very probably to take out one of our bases in Turkey, and
make a quick tune[?], and then sit down and talk. I think the whole purpose of
this exercise is to build up to talk with you, in which we try to negotiate out
the bases. There are a lot of things that point to that, one thing that struck me
very much is that it is so easy to camouflage these things or to hide them in
the woods, why didn't they do it in the first place? They surely expected us to
see it at some stage. The point of fact, the purpose was for preparations for
negotiations.

Robert Kennedy: Maybe they had something?

Unidentified voice: They may.

Maxwell Taylor: May I ask whether military moves in these five, five days period
would be acceptable in some point of view to the State Department?

Dean Rusk?: Oh yeah, certainly

Dean Rusk?: Certainly it would be helpful.

Unidentified voice: Now of course, Mr. President, there are obvious counters to
the blockade. ...

[Several voices, unintelligible]

Robert Kennedy: And also the argument against the blockade is that it's very
slow death, and it kills up, and goes over a period of months, and during that
period of time you've got all these people yelling and screaming, examination of
Russian ships and shooting down of Russian planes that try to land there, you
have to do all those things.

[Further discussion of options]

Unidentified voice/George Ball?: ... [unintelligible] ... the Soviet reaction, if as
Tommy and Chip predicted, the Soviets would not try to run the blockade, then
they would have deserted their friends in Cuba, and I think there would be
serious political chaos in Cuba if the Soviets deserted their own comrades[?].

Unidentified voice: Also, I assume that you would be in negotiations with
Khrushchev.

Unidentified voice: In the case of any of these attacks in all logic you would
have a blockade ... [unintelligible] ... all of these military actions apply also to a blockade.

Unidentified voice: I agree.

Unidentified voice: Oh yeah, sure, sure.

Unidentified voice: What would you do about a declaration of war?

Robert Kennedy?: Simultaneously, seems to me you declare that a state of war
exists, and you call the Congress.

Llewellyn Thompson: I think that Khrushchev will deny that these are Soviet
bases. ... [unintelligible] ... I think what he'd say, what are you getting so
excited about? We have, the Cubans asked us for us the missiles to deal with
these emigre bases which are threatening, have attacked and are threatening
attack. These are not missiles, other than defensive. They're much less
offensive than your weapons in Turkey. You've got these armed with nuclear
warheads. We haven't given them nuclear weapons. These are simply to deal
with the threats to Cuba. That would be the general line.

Unidentified voice: Well, that would be patently false on its face as to the
nature of the weapons.

[Several voices, unintelligible]

Robert Kennedy: If we act, it better be Cuban missiles.

Unidentified voice: Surely.

Unidentified voice: I think our action is aimed at Cuba, just as much as possible
in this situation.

Llewellyn Thompson?: You ought to make it, if you do that, perhaps, as easy as
possible for him to back down. I think almost certainly it leads to his answer
would be also this is so serious, I'm prepared to talk to you about it. You could
scarcely refuse that with world war being threatened. And I think you
immediately assume the next step. That's why I think the attorney general's point, though certainly valid, is somewhat weakened in that during this period you would be negotiating out of this thing.

Robert McNamara?: But if he were to say let's talk, then you would have to say to him then stop immediately all activities on such and such fields, sites and so forth...

Llewellyn Thompson: Having imposed the blockade how do you do it?

John Kennedy: The blockade wouldn't be sufficient, he could go on developing the things he's got there. You don't know how much he's got there.

Unidentified voice: He would, uh, you impose a blockade, impose a blockade on Cuba, and he imposes a blockade on Berlin, and then you start to talk. And then you would trade these 2 off.

Unidentified voice: That's what he'd figure.

Unidentified voice: That's what he'd figure, yes.

Llewellyn Thompson: It seems to me one of the points of this ... [unintelligible] ... always curious as to why said he'd defer this till after the election ... [unintelligible] ...

John McCone: Mr. President, you might be interested in General Eisenhower's reaction to this ... [unintelligible] ... I briefed him ... [unintelligible] ... careful, I think, not to take any position, because I had no position. I was very careful not to indicate your position ... [unintelligible] ... However I should report that the thrust of his comments, would indicate that he felt, firstly, the existence ... [unintelligible] ... capabilities in Cuba was intolerable ... [unintelligible] ... Secondly, I think that he felt that limited actions, such as strafing, as anticipated, in 1 or 2 or even 3, of this paper[?] would not be satisfactory. It would cause the greatest of fear and concern among[?] our allies, and in all areas of the world, for the Soviets might take similar action against installations,
United States installations over in Germany ... [unintelligible] ... Turkey or Pakistan or elsewhere.

He felt, really, that if a move was made, and I think I pinned him down, he would recommend it, it should be an all out military action. He talked of conceiving it to go right to the jugular first, and not an invasion, landing on the beach and working slowly across the island, but concentratedattacks right off the bat, at first, in the heart of it ... [unintelligible] ... And he felt that this was done, probably the thing ... [unintelligible] ... could be done with the minimum loss of life. Now he said that without the benefit of specific knowledge of troop deployments and equipment deployments and so forth. ... [unintelligible] ... I thought this would be of interest to you.

[Further discussion on options]

Art Lundahl & JFK

 

Art Lundahl is identified as the person on the left. Who is the person between him and JFK?

http://www.presidentialufo.com/old_site/kennedy1.htm

Arthur Lundahl, director of the top CIA photo lab in Washington D.C., seen here on the left was the man who discovered the missiles in Cuba and who briefed President Kennedy on the subject.

He was also, however, a man deeply interested in UFOs with a huge UFO library at home, and an active involvement with the subject for 25 years.

Lundahl was rumored to have been the briefer for three presidents on the subject of UFOs. He was involved with the photo analysis for the CIA Robertson, involved with the 1952 Washington flying saucer fragment that was sent to Wilbert Smith in Canada. He was also involved with the famous July 6, 1959 channeling of AFFA the alien at NPIC, where Lundahl and 6 other CIA employees watched a flying saucers fly by the window and sit above the capitol.

Arthur Lundahl, 77, C.I.A. Aide Who Found Missile Sites in Cuba

http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/26/nyregion/arthur-lundahl-77-cia-aide-who-found-missile-sites-in-cuba.html

By BRUCE LAMBERT
Published: Friday, June 26, 1992

Arthur C. Lundahl, an aerial-photography expert whose detection of missile installations in Cuba in 1962 led to the Cuban missile crisis, died on Monday at Suburban Hospital in Bethesda, Md.

He was 77 years old and lived in Bethesda.

He died of respiratory failure, his family said.

Mr. Lundahl, an authority in aerial-photograph intelligence, was the founding director of the Central Intelligence Agency's National Photographic Interpretation Center.

Analyzing reconnaissance films, he briefed Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy as well as the nation's top military and diplomatic officials. Mr. Lundahl provided critical intelligence on the arms race and many other international crises, including those involving the Suez Canal; Quemoy and Matsu, islands controlled by Taiwan; Tibet; Lebanon, and Laos.

Geology and Photography

Early in his career he combined his academic training as a geologist with his hobby as a photographer to become an expert in deciphering the details of surface features in pictures and distinguishing natural features from those made by humans.

He developed his new skills during World War II while serving in the Navy, studying aerial photographs of targets in Japan and the Aleutian and Kurile islands.

When the war ended, he became the civilian chief of the Naval Photographic Center's Photogrammetry Division. In 1953, the C.I.A. hired him to organize its own aerial intelligence efforts, which were growing with the advent of high-resolution photographs taken from high-altitude U-2 airplanes. Later, space satellites further expanded the field.

Mr. Lundahl's discovery of the Cuban missile installations was a major feat in the annals of intelligence.

His findings, which he reported to President Kennedy at the White House, contradicted the expectations of political and military analysts. The information led Kennedy to impose a blockade on Cuba to cut off further arms shipments. Eventually the Soviet Union withdrew the missiles.

When Mr. Lundahl retired in 1973, he was given a Presidential medal and awards from the C.I.A. and Defense Intelligence Agency, and Queen Elizabeth knighted him. He was also a past president of the American Society of Photogrammetry.

Mr. Lundahl was born in Chicago. He graduated from the University of Chicago in 1939 and earned his master's degree there in 1942. He worked as a field geologist and park ranger.

His wife of 42 years, the former Mary Hvid, died in 1986. He is survived by a daughter, Ann Lundahl; a son, Robert Lundahl, and a granddaughter, all of Bethesda.

AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY - AND THE UFO CONNECTION

http://www.eyepod.org/WTZ-2.html

A formerly SECRET report released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) shows that CIA officials and consultants thought people seeing and reporting UFOs was more
dangerous than UFOs themselves, stating, "the continued emphasis on the reporting of these phenomena [UFOs] does, in these perilous times, result in a threat to the orderly functioning of the protective organs of the body politic.

" Another 'danger' cited by the CIA panel was that acknowledging UFOs could results in "...the cultivation of a morbid national psychology in which hostile propaganda could induce hysterical behavior and a harmful distrust of duly constituted authority."

To counter these supposed dangers, the CIA panel recommended a policy of "debunking" and education designed to persuade people that what they were seeing really wasn't there.

In explaining how this psychological warfare against the American people should be carried out, the report stated:

"The debunking aim would result in reduction of public interest in 'flying saucers' which today evokes a strong psychological reaction. This education could be accomplished by mass media such as television, motion pictures and popular articles"
The panel had further ideas on how what was essentially a disinformation program should be mounted, stating: "It was felt strongly that psychologists familiar with mass psychology should advise on the nature and extent of the program." The report went on to name certain psychologists who might be recruited to join the debunking project.

The formation of the CIA panel came about as a sort of compromise worked out by the National Security Council (NSC) after events in the summer of 1952. A major UFO flap had taken place across the country, highlighted by puzzling incidents in July 1952, when UFO intruders were simultaneously tracked on ground radar and observed by
jet interceptor pilots over the nation's capital, Washington, DC. The public, the press, and even President Harry Truman demanded to know what was going on. As a result, the US Air Force held a major press conference on July 29, 1952, the largest press conference since WW II, at which it was suggested the UFOs were temperature inversions--layers of warm air trapped under cold air that, by some giant stretch of the Air Force's imagination, were tracked on radar and seen as maneuvering flying craft by pilots sent aloft on scramble alert.

In August 1952, as documents released as the result of the FOIA suit filed by the author confirm, the CIA began reviewing the Air Force's handling of UFOs. Ransom Eng, an official with the CIA's office of Scientific Intelligence, wrote a report in which he characterized the Air Force's efforts as "scientifically invalid."
Armed with these criticisms, the CIA wanted to take charge of UFO intelligence [the collection and analysis of UFO evidence], and proposed, through CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith, that UFOs were much too serious of a matter to be left in the hands of the USAF. The National Security Council, however, would only approve a compromise
whereby a CIA-appointed panel would review UFO reports provided by the Air Force to determine if UFOs were a "direct, hostile threat to national security."

The struggle for power and funding between the U.S. Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency had been on-going since 1947, the year the CIA was officially created and the Air Force became a separate service branch [after being part of the Army previously]. It would continue for decades thereafter throughout the Cold War with the Soviet Union, and include highly exaggerated Air Force Intelligence claims of Soviet bomber and missile superiority and 'first-strike' civil defense preparations, even though in 1955 the CIA gained somewhat of an upper hand with
the development and covert deployment of the U-2 high altitude spy plane--at least in the sense of getting the President's ear.

In January 1953 the CIA's Robertson Panel, mostly consulting scientists of the CIA's chosen to review the UFO evidence selected by the USAF, rejected the conclusions of the U.S. government's top photo analysts from the Naval Photographic Interpretation Center (NAVPIC), Anacostia, MD, Capt. Arthur Lundahl and Lt. Robert Neasham, who had concluded the objects in two 8mm UFO films submitted to the Air Force and examined by the CIA Panel were extraterrestrial spacecraft. Both men were reportedly emotionally shattered by the Panel's rejection of their studied conclusions.


But within a matter of days Lundahl and Neasham were invited by the CIA to resign their Navy officers' commissions and come over to the CIA as civilians and establish the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) at 5th & K Streets in Washington,DC, with Lundahl serving as the founding Director for the next twenty years and Neasham as his top assistant. In 1954 Lundahl was informed the CIA would begin flying high altitude reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Untion and Soviet Bloc [and China] the following year. Lundahl therefore went out an acquired the world's best computer, a large Swiss-built machine, and set out developing computer-enhanced photo analysis in order to extract intelligence from photos taken from 100,000 feet up.

The mastermind of what was to become the U.S. government's UFO policy and author of the CIA's Robertson Panel Report, which found that UFOs did not pose "a direct, hostile threat to National Security," was Fred Durant, an officer with the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) who at the time was operating under the cover of being a civilian scientist employed by the Arthur Little Co. In fact, in August 1952 Durant, claiming to represent a small group of "concerned scientists" [actually CIA officers] had approached USAF Captain Ed Ruppelt, Commanding
Officer (CO) of the Air Force's UFO 'study,' Project Blue Book, and USAF Maj, Dewey Fournet, the Pentagon's liaison to Blue Book.

Most revealingly, the CIA had found it necessary to spy on the Air Force in order to find out what it had collected on UFOs, and Fred Durant had been the perfect man for the secret mission. Similarly, a few years later after the Soviets beat America to the punch with the launch of Sputnik, the first artificial satellite to orbit the Earth, the CIA's Fred Durant brought America's top rocket scientists together with our top satellite developers and began the American space program.

After the Robertson Panel meetings in early 1953, in which it became known that Durant had spied on the Air Force for the CIA in order to learn the USAF's UFO secrets, the men who'd cooperated with Durant [and thus the CIA], Ed Ruppelt and Dewey Fournet, were forced out of the service as punishment by the USAF's high-ranking Pentagon brass, and the dispute over control of UFO intelligence....

Copyright (c) 2005 by W. Todd Zechel
P.O. Box 117
Prairie du Sac, WI 53578-0117
next in "Close Encounters of the Government Kind pt3"
"The CIA Takes Control"