The Dealey Plaza Operation - The Administrative
Details (Originally posted in 2005)
Rather than the act of a lone, deranged gunman, if
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy was a conspiracy, then it was
more specifically defined as a covert intelligence operation, the purpose of
which is to shield the actual perpetrators through deception and
disinformation.
As a covert coup, however, and not just a whispered
conspiracy, there are code names, strategic and tactical plans, and documented records that reflect the policy, administration, payments,
management, training, assignments and tasks necessary t successfully execute
such a covert intelligence operation, what I call the Dealey Plaza Operation
(DPO).
This historical administrative record shows that the
assassination was not the work of a lone-nut nor a renegade CIA-Mafia-Cuban
intelligence network, but a well planned, coordinated, integrated and official
program – an inside job – coup d’etat by a domestic, anti-Communist network
active in the anti-Castro Cuban project, and still active today as it continues
to promote the Castro-did it Cover Story.
It is possible to document and detail the official
approval of the covert intelligence operations that led to the assassination
because a direct relationship can be established between those at the top who
requested, approved and directed three specific anti-Castro Cuban maritime
operations – the Bayo-Pawley raid (June 8, 1963), the JMWAVE sabotage
operations, the Rex mission (Oct. 26-30, 1963), the activities of John
Rosselli’s commando team and Clare Booth Luce’s “boys,” which included Julio
Fernandez and others in the DRE network that operated in Louisiana and Florida
in the summer and fall of 1963.
In records released in batches unrelated to the JFK
Act, documents from the National Security Council, Special Operations Group and
Cuban Coordinating Committee – Covert Operations in Cuba (CCC-COC) all
establish an administrative and paper trail, and set a time-line of related
covert events. They list the names of those in the CCC-COC loop who attended
the relevant meetings, and detail the types of operations planned and approved
by the President and those “disapproved” that were eventually utilized against
him.
These documents are complimented by more recently released records under the JFK Act, and posted at MaryFerrell.org - under the Joint Chief of Staff Records.
The line of power went from the President - and Attorney General (RFK) to the National Security Council (NSC) and Special Group (Augmented by RFK) that approved or disapproved CIA covert operational plans against Cuba. The approved plans went to Task Force W - set up in the basement of CIA HQ, and directed by William Harvey (until October 1962 when he was replaced by Desmond FitzGerald). From there the approved operations went to Ted Shackley at JMWAVE, the University of Miami South Campus, and from there to the anti-Castro Cuban covert commandos, paid and trained by the CIA and military.
These documents are complimented by more recently released records under the JFK Act, and posted at MaryFerrell.org - under the Joint Chief of Staff Records.
The line of power went from the President - and Attorney General (RFK) to the National Security Council (NSC) and Special Group (Augmented by RFK) that approved or disapproved CIA covert operational plans against Cuba. The approved plans went to Task Force W - set up in the basement of CIA HQ, and directed by William Harvey (until October 1962 when he was replaced by Desmond FitzGerald). From there the approved operations went to Ted Shackley at JMWAVE, the University of Miami South Campus, and from there to the anti-Castro Cuban covert commandos, paid and trained by the CIA and military.
These records also help us identify those who were
responsible for carrying them out, and we can follow them from the marching
orders approved at these meetings to what we know actually happened at both the
sea level off Cuba and in the streets of Dallas.
While many hundreds if not thousands of plots and
plans were hatched against Castro and Cuba by the anti-Castro exiles, the CIA
and the Mafia, these three naval operations can be directly connected the
assassination. Not part of Mongoose, these were part of a specific and
different covert action scheme devised and approved in the spring of 1963.
THE KENNEDYS AND CUBA
From documents published in THE KENNEDYS AND CUBA (by Mark J. White, 1999, Ivan R. Dee
Publisher, 1332 North Halsted Street, Chicago, Ill. 60622), it is possible to
trace the Cuban operations related to the assassination back to their origins
in administrative policy.
According to Mark White, “John Kennedy, it can be
argued, changed as a president during the final year of his life. The Cuban
missile crisis appears to have sobered him, increasing his inclination to make
the cold war safer. Examples of this new resolve came in the summer of 1963,
with his famous speech at American University, noteworthy for its conciliatory
attitude toward the Soviet Union, and signing of the Test Ban Treaty, which
limited nuclear testing. A more progressive phase in his civil rights policies
in 1963, with the introduction in Congress of a sweeping bill designed to end
segregation, can be viewed as the domestic counterpart to this more
accommodating thrust in his foreign policy”
As White points out, “…when JFK and his advisors did
turn their attention to Castro, their attitude was strikingly and troublingly
reminiscent of their pre-missile crisis outlook: they remained determined to
use covert means to undermine Castro’s position. In June 1963 JFK gave the
go-ahead for a CIA plan to carry out sabotage and other hostile action against
Cuba. It was a sort of condensed version of Operation Mongoose. Some of the documents…demonstrate
that Russian officials soon learned of the resumption of covert U.S. pressure
on Cuba, making this issue a bone of contention between the superpowers in the
fall of 1963.”
After setting the covert sabotage actions into
motion, these operations were supplemented by a second, ostensibly secret,
back-channel diplomatic approach to détente with Cuba. Just as the anti-Castro
operations were penetrated by Cuban G2 double-agents, and made known to the
Russian leaders, the secret back channel negotiations were made known to the
covert saboteurs.
JFK’S United Nations BACKCHANNEL TO CASTRO
“In contrasting to this continuing effort to harass
Castro, however,” White writes of the dichotomy, “the Kennedy administration
pursued another clandestine strategy in the fall of 1963, this one aimed at
generating a dialog with the Cuban leader. William Attwood…kept senior
administration officials abreast of his efforts. Had Kennedy not been
assassinated, this initiative may conceivably have brought about an accommodation
with Castro.”
While Attwood had introduced JFK to Mary Meyer when they were students in prep school, the Cuban side was represented by Carlos Lechuga, the former Cuban ambassador to Mexico who had an affair with Silvia Duran, the Mexican national who worked at the Cuban embassy and dealt with Oswald in his purported attempt to get a visa to Cuba.
As for RFK, concludes White, “Robert Kennedy, such a
conspicuous figure on the Cuban matters in 1961-62, was less prominent in 1963
in shaping administration policy towards Castro. But his role remained
significant.”
But it is RFK's support for JMWAVE covert operations against Cuba in 1963 that play the most prominent role in the assassination operation.
CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR AN ATTACK ON CUBA
CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR AN ATTACK ON CUBA
White’s synopsis of a Memorandum for the Record
Drafted by Chairman of the JCS (Maxwell) Taylor as “Contingency planning for an
attack on Cuba, an important feature of the Kennedy administration’s covert
approach towards Castro before the missile crisis, continues in 1963, with
JFK’s active involvement.”
A revision of the basic invasion plan for Cuba
CINCLANT was reviewed and approved by the JCS on February 26, 1963, with “the
most significant change in the basic invasion plan since last October has
resulted from our increasing capability to introduce large numbers of troops
and heavy equipment into the objective area early in the operation. This
capability is being achieved by the reactivation of 11 LSTs…and programmed
acquisition of additional C-130 aircraft.”
A February 28, 1963 memo, datelined Washington,
reflects a meeting of the JCS with the President, which lasted from 5:30 p.m.
to 6:45 p.m., with the following subjects being the principle topics of
discussion:
“a. The Cuban Invasion Plan. (1) The Chiefs
discussed the time-space factors in the implementation of CINCLANT Operation
Plan 312 and 316.
[1. These were contingency plans for an attack on Cuba,
developed before the missile crisis.]…The President was shown why it would take
approximately 18 days from decision to D-day from the present troop and ship
dispositions. In order to reduce this time to something like 7 days,
considerable prepositioning would be required in order to get Army/Marine units
to the East Coast and to assemble the necessary cargo shipping. The Chiefs
expressed the view that it was unlikely that a period of tension would not
proceed a decision to invade Cuba which would allow ample time for preparatory
measures; hence, it was undesirable to make permanent changes of station of
Army and Marine unites which would upset the present disposition of strategic
reserve forces.
(2) The President expressed particular interest in
the possibility of getting some troops quickly into Cuba in the event of a
general uprising. He was told that only the airborne troops could arrive with
little delay, that the first Marine elements would require about 7 days before
landing. He asked the Chiefs to develop specific plans in anticipation of the
need for this kind of quick reaction.”
On April Fools Day, April 1, 1963, the Cuban
Coordinating Committee – Covert Operations in Cuba (CCC-COC) met, the subject
of an April 3 memo from Gordon Chase of the National Security Council to
McGeorge Bundy, the President’s Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs. It included a still classified agenda and matters discussed by the
Cottrell Committee, which White identifies as “An interdepartmental committee,
chaired by Sterling J. Cottrell, in early 1963 to coordinate the
administration’s covert and overt Cuban policies.”
Among those in the CCC-COC meeting were Secretary
Vance, Joe Califano, Dick Helms, Dez FitzGerald and Bob Hurwitch, who discussed
“Ballon Operations Over Havana, a plan that was “well under way,” given
favorable winds, that would release balloons containing hundreds of thousands
of leaflets designed by the CIA propaganda shop, which “attack Castro’s
henchmen and contain cartoons illustrating sabotage techniques.” Another review
is scheduled before this is put into operation.
Also on the agenda of this meeting was finding appropriate
installations for the “Training of CIA-Sponsored Cuban Exiles on Military
Reservations – CIA and the Army,” and “The Russian Language Programs – The
Committee decided in favor of instituting three programs (Radio Liberty, Radio
Caribe, and an intrusion program…”
In summary, Gordon Chase notes, “In approving the
three programs for Special Group considerations, the committee recognized that
they will probably be of marginal value only: however, they will cost us very
little, financial or otherwise.”
Under agenda item number four, “Sabotage of Cuban
Shipping – The Committee…will recommend to the Special Group the incendiaries
which would be timed to go off in international waters and the abrasives in the
machinery. While the propaganda boost might be nil, they are easier to effect
than limpets and could really hurt Castro.”
Then Chase tells McBundy, “The Committee gave the
CIA the option of using its own Cubans or of using DRE as a cut-out.”
The DRE are the anti-Castro Cuban Student
Revolutionary Directorate, whose members interacted with Oswald before the
assassination.
Then the meeting briefly discussed “The Redirection
of Cuban Exile Group Operations,” asking themselves the question of “what is an
acceptable target?”
In response, “Dick Helms pointed out that although
these groups may start out to get a non-Soviet target, once you let them go,
you can never really be sure what they will do.”
Let me repeat that: “DICK HELMS POINTED OUT THAT
ALTHOUGH THESE GROUPS MAY START OUT TO GET A NON-SOVIET TARGET, ONCE YOU LET
THEM GO, YOU CAN NEVER REALLY BE SURE WHAT THEY WILL DO.”
Bob Hurwitch, the memo mentions, “seemed to favor
the approach that attacks and sabotage should appear to come from inside rather
than outside Cuba.”
Rather incredulously, Chase concludes, “The
Committee came to no decision on this one. More thinking is needed.” Indeed.
On the same April 3rd 1963 day Gordon Chase wrote
that memo to McGeorge Bundy, RFK met with the Russian ambassador Dobrynin and
reported to the President that, “We exchanged pleasantries. He told me that
Norman Cousins had asked to see Khrushchev and he had arranged it…Another point
that was made was a sharp and bitter criticism about the raids that had taken
place against Russian ships (in Cuba).”
It is noted that:
“[3. On March 26, anti-Castro
group L-66 sunk the Baku, a Russian vessel, at the Cuban harbor of Caibarien
only a week after another Soviet ship had been attacked in a Cuban port.]”
“These were piratical acts and the United States
must take responsibility for them. It isn’t possible,” RFK quoted Dobrynin, “to
believe that if we really wanted to stop these raids that we could not do so.
They were glad to hear of the steps that are being taken lately but in the last
analysis the specific acts, namely, the arrests that we made would be the
criteria by which they would judge our sincerity. The Soviet Union questions
whether in fact we wish to end these attacks for our criticism of them has been
not that they were wrong but they were ineffective. The clear implication was
that if the raids had been effective they would have had our approval.”
About a week later, on April 9, 1963, Joseph A.
Califano, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army wrote a memo to his
boss, Cyrus R. Vance, which White describes as, “JFK decides which of the
covert operations proposed him would be carried out.”
Under the Subject, “President Action on Special
Group Items Concerning Cuba,” Califano checks off the items, beginning with,
“1. The President rejected the balloon item on the recommendations of Ed
Morrow,” so the project that was “well underway,” was scuttled before it could
get off the ground because JFK talked about it with Ed Morrow.
“The President approved the propaganda item
(inciting Cubans to harass, attack and sabotage Soviet military personnel in
Cuba) provided every precaution is taken to prevent attribution.”
“The President approved the sabotage of cargos on
Cuban ships and the crippling of ships (through sand in the gears, etc.); With
respect to Russian language broadcasts, the President (a) rejected such
broadcasts by exile groups over Radio Caribe in the Domincian Republic, rejected
black intrusion on the use of such broadcasts on Radio Liberty from North
Carolina, pending consultation with Lleweellyn Thompson.”
“We have also agreed with CIA that we would spot
about 20 inductees now in training at Fort Jackson whom we consider to have the
necessary characteristics for CIA operations inside Cuba. These personnel, along with those given jump training under 5 above,
would also be used in advance of the introduction of Special Forces, should
there be a decision to invade Cuba.”
Sterling J. Cottrell, the Coordinator of Cuban
Affairs to the Special Group, wrote a memo on April 18, 1963, which White says,
“reviews current covert actions against Castro and poses the question whether
these actions should be intensified.”
Under SUBJECT: “Proposed New Covert Policy and
Program Toward Cuba,” Cottrell wrote, “A. The following guidelines are being
used in our present covert policy towards Cuba:
1. Producing comprehensive
intelligence related to our basic policy objectives….
2. Intensifying covert
collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime.
3.
Supporting the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the
original aims of the 26 of July Movement [1. A reference to the original effort
to spark a revolution in Cuba when Castro and his cohorts tried to seize the
Moncada military barracks in 1953.] and who believe that the Castro regime can
be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the
leadership of the retime… create a political base of opposition…
4) The use
of a variety of propaganda media to stimulate passive resistance….
5) The
placing of incendiary devices and/or explosives with suitable time delay within
the hull or cargo to disable or sink Cuban vessels and/or damage their cargos
while on the high seas…
6) Introduce abrasives and other damaging material….”
Cottrell then poses the questions, “1) Should the
U.S. move beyond the above policy to a program of sabotage, harassment and
resistance activities? 2) What kind of effective action can be taken? 3) What
capabilities do we possess? 4) What repercussions can we expect?”
In this memo, Cottrell also says, “Surface attacks
by maritime assets firing on Cuban ships in Cuban waters. When the maritime
asset cannot reach the target, shore based attacks on shipping in port or
passing the offshore keys will be undertaken….Considerations: Attack craft from
the sea would be manned by Cubans. Shore based attacks by paramilitary trained
Cubans firing on ships with recoilless rifles, rocket launchers or 20mm cannon.
First sea attack in May and once monthly thereafter. First shore based attack
in June. These operations would disrupt coastal commerce. US would probably be
blamed. Cuban reprisal measures possible. Soviets likely allege US
culpability….Externally mounted hit and run attacks against land targets.
Examples: molasses tanker, petroleum storage dumps, naval refueling base,
refineries, power plants.”
Under “Considerations,” Cottrell notes, “Operations
conducted by Cubans with paramilitary training. High possibilities of complex
operations going awry. First attack in April, with one per month thereafter.
Effects would be increased exile morale, some economic disruption.
Repercussions would include charges of US sponsorship and increased Cuban
security force activities…”
Cottrell includes an attachment on the subject of “A
Covert Harassment/Sabotage Program against Cuba,” which states, “This paper
presents a covert Harassment/Sabotage program targeted against Cuba: including
are those sabotage plans which have previously been approved as well as new
proposals…Loses in men and equipment with the attendant adverse publicity must
be expected. Even without such loses, US attribution would be claimed. When
policy and guidelines of the overall sabotage program are established, it will
be possible progressively to develop up to a limit additional covert assets and
support capabilities.
However, materially to increase the pace of operations, a
period of four to six months is required. Ultimate limiting factors are
weather, length of ‘dark of the moon’ period each month and appropriate
targets. A source of additional agent personnel is from Cuban personnel trained
by the US Military Forces under the recent programs, but released to civilian
status….”
That April 29th 1963, RFK and members of the
Standing Group of the National Security Council met in Washington at 5pm, but
the memo prepared by McGeorge Bundy has yet to be declassified and released,
other than its title: “A Sketch of the Cuban Alternatives.”
The same day, JFK sent a memo to Secretary of
Defense McNamara, pressing his request for the military to develop contingency
plans for Cuba. JFK wrote, “Are we keeping our Cuban contingency invasion plans
up to date? I notice that there have been a number of new judgments on the
amount of equipment that the Cubans have. I thought last October the number of
troops we planned to have available was rather limited and the success of the
operation was dependent upon, in large measure, our two airborne divisions
getting in and controlling the two airfields. It seems to be that we should
strengthen our contingency plans on this operation.”
According to Mark White, “John Kennedy, it can be
argued, changed as a president during the final year of his life. The Cuban
missile crisis appears to have sobered him, increasing his inclination to make
the cold war safer. Examples of this new resolve came in the summer of 1963,
with his famous speech at American University, noteworthy for its conciliatory
attitude toward the Soviet Union, and signing of the Test Ban Treaty, which
limited nuclear testing. A more progressive phase in his civil rights policies
in 1963, with the introduction in Congress of a sweeping bill designed to end
segregation, can be viewed as the domestic counterpart to this more
accommodating thrust in his foreign policy”
Let's not forget about the effects of Kennedy's LSD
trips with Mary Meyer that last year of his life. I don't intend this comment
in a trivial way. LSD is not an intoxicant so much as a life-changing
perspective.
Regardless of any distinction about LSD, President
Kennedy was known to be a drug user to the degree that would permit
self-honorable people to consider him incapable of embodying a necessarily
credible nuclear deterrent. Shanet Clark's thesis of 25th Amendment-type
incapacity would apply. JFK may truly have become unable to wage nuclear
diplomacy, let alone war.
COUP II – The Administrative Details – By William
Kelly
In Washington, on June 8, 1963, an unidentified CIA
officer wrote a paper for the Standing Group of the National Security Council
on the Subject of “Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action
Towards Cuba.”
“Submitted herewith is a covert program for Cuba
within the CIA’s capabilities. Some parts of the program have already been
approved and are being implemented. Being closely inter-related, the total
cumulative impact of the courses of action set forth in this program is
dependent upon the simultaneous coordinated execution of the individual courses
of action.”
“This program,” the officer notes, “is based on the
assumption that current U.S. policy does not contemplate outright military
intervention in Cuba or a provocation which can be used as a pretext for an
invasion of Cuba by United States military forces. It is further assumed that
U.S. policy calls for the exertion of maximum pressure by all means available
to the U.S. government, short of military intervention…”
In the “Discussion of Components of an Integrated
Program,” they mention the collection of covert intelligence, propaganda
actions “to stimulate low-risk sabotage and other forms of passive resistance,”
and the “exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban military.”
As for General sabotage and harassment, “These
operations will be conducted either by externally held assets [Note: Presumably
a reference to Cuban émigrés] now available or existing external assets or
those to be developed. Assets trained and controlled by the CIA will be used as
well as selected autonomous exile groups. Initially, the emphasis will be on
the use of externally held assets with a shift to internal assets as soon as
operational feasible….”
Under “Support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban
groups to supplement and assist in the execution of the above courses of
action,” six items are listed.
“1) It is the keystone of the autonomous
operations that they will be executed exclusively by Cuban national motivated
by the conviction that the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime must be
accomplished by Cubans both inside and outside Cuba acting in consonance.”
“2) The effort will probably cost many Cuban lives.
If this cost in lives becomes unacceptable to the U.S. conscience, autonomous
operations can be effectively halted by the withdraw of US support, but once
halted, it cannot be resumed.”
“3) All autonomous operations will be mounted from
outside the territory of the United States.”
“4) The United States Government must be prepared to
deny publicly any participation in these acts no matter how loud or even how
accurate may be the reports of US complicity.”
“5) The US presence and direct participation in the
operation would be kept to an absolute minimum….
“6) These operations would not be undertaken within
a fixed time schedule.”
The very day that the CIA prepared this paper for
the Standing Group of the NSC, June 8, 1963, a team of Cubans led by Eddie Bayo
and Americans (John Martino, Richard Billings) left Florida aboard William
Pawley’s boat the Flying Tiger II, on a mission to the Cuban coast near
Baracoa, where Bayo and his men were infiltrated.
William Turner, [in Rearview Mirror, p. 194]
reports, “In 1995 ex-Cuban security chief General Fabian Escalante told me that
Bayo’s boat was found swamped near Baracoa, but there were no signs of its
occupants.”
On June 19, 1963, JFK held a meeting at the White
House concerning the “Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action
towards Cuba.” Present were Higher Authority (JFK), Secretary McNamara, Under
Secretary Harriman, Mr. McCone, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Thomas Parrott, Mr.
Desmond FitzGerald and Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. W. F. McKee.
According to the report of the meeting, prepared by
Desmond FitzGerald, “The program as recommended by the Standing Group of the
NSC was presented briefly to Higher Authority who showed a particular interest
in proposed external sabotage operations. He was shown charts indicating
typical targets for this program and a discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages ensued. It is well recognized that there would be failures and a
considerable noise level….Mr. Bundy described the integrated nature of the
program presented and made the point that, having made a decision to go ahead,
we be prepared to give the program a real chance. Mr. Harriman stated that the
program would b ‘reviewed weekly’ by the Special Group….”
“Higher Authority,” the report notes, “asked how
soon we could get into action with the external sabotage program and was told
that we should be able to conduct our first operation in the dark-of-the-moon
period in July although he was informed that we would prefer to start the
program with some caution selecting softer targets to begin with. Higher
Authority said this was a matter of our judgment. Although at one stage in the
discussion Higher Authority said that we should move ahead with the program ‘this
summer’ it is believed that Mr. Bundy will be able to convince him that this is
not a sufficiently long trial period to demonstrate what the program can do.”
Although there is a break in the official records so
far released, the Summer of 1963 was extremely active, especially in New
Orleans and Florida, where the Cuban émigrés “externally held assets” prepared
to be infiltrated to Cuba and CIA backed marine raiders deposited commandos and
assassins in Cuba and Russian, Cuban and some neutral ships were attacked at
sea.
The covert operations devised and approved by the
Standing Committee of the National Security Council, Sterling J. Cottrell and
the Special Group, Cuban Coordinating Committee – Covert Operations in Cuba
(CCC-COC) and the President, were now operational, and because the Cuban assets
were penetrated by the Cubans, the fact that these operations were approved at
the highest levels of government was known to the Russian leaders. And it was a
card they had to play.
In Washington (on September 10, 1963),
Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn E. Thompson prepared a memo of his conversation
with the Russians and JFK’s response. As described by Mark White, the editor
The Kennedys and Cuba, “In a secret message to JFK, Khrushchev makes clear that
he is aware of the recent resumption of sabotage by the United States against
Cuba. He also warns Kennedy that the Soviet Union will respond if Cuba is
attacked.”
“Responding to Khrushchev’s September 10 message,
JFK tries to change the subject from sabotage against Cuba to Cuban subversion
in Latin America.”
Llewellyn notes that the official policy of the US
remains the response to the March 26th attack on the Russian ship Baku, “In
keeping with the March 30, 1963 declaration by the Department of State and
Justice concerning hit and run attacks by Cuban exile groups against targets in
Cuba, the law enforcement agencies are taking vigorous measures to assure that
the pertinent laws of the United States are observed…”
But they weren’t being observed as far as the CIA backed
Cuban raiders were concerned, at least those whose ships were based and docked
in Florida.
At the same time that the anti-Castro Cuban raiders
were attacking Russian and Cuban ships at sea and depositing commandos and
assassins in Cuba, Castro and JFK were involved in a back channel dialog that
began in New York City on August 26, 1963 when special US delegate to the UN
William Attwood met Seyodou Diallo, the Guinea Ambassador to Havana.
Attwood, a former roommate of JFK at prep school
(who introduced him to Mary Pinchot Meyer), and former editor at Look magazine,
had previously served as US ambassador to Guinea (March 1961-May 1963) before
being posted to the UN. According Attwood’s memo on the meeting, Diallo “went
out of his way to tell me that Castro was isolated from contact with neutralist
diplomats by his ‘Communist entourage’…Diallo, had finally been able to see
Castro alone once and was convinced he was personally receptive to changing
courses and getting Cuba on the road to non-alignment…”
As White describes the situation, “By the autumn of
1963 the Kennedy administration was pursuing a two-track policy towards Castro.
While sabotage activities against Castro continued, an effort was under way to
develop a secret dialog with Castro, with a view to achieving some sort of
accommodation between Havana and Washington…”
In the first week of September 1963, Attwood read
Lisa Howard’s article “Castro’s Overture” [War/Peace Report, September 1963],
which Attwood knew was based on her interview with Castro in April. As
summarized by Attwood, “This article stressed Castro’s expressed desire for
reaching an accommodation with the United States and a willingness to make
substantial concessions to this end.”
Attwood talked personally with Lisa Howard on September
12, “and she echoed Ambassador Diallo’s opinion that there was a rift between
Castro and the Guevara-Hart-Alveida group on the question of Cuba’s future
course.” That same day Attwood expressed these opinions with Under Secretary of
State Harriman in Washington.
In his chronology of the negotiations (written on
November 8, 1963), Attwood states:
“On September 23, I met Dr. Lechuga at Miss Howard’s
apartment. She has been on good terms with Lechuga since her visit to Castro
and invited him for a drink to me(e)t some friends who had been to Cuba. I was
just one of those friends. In the course of our conversation, which started
with recollections of my own talks with Castro in 1959, I mentioned having read
Miss Howard’s article. Lechuga hinted that Castro was indeed in a mood to talk.
I told him that in my present position, I would need official authorization to
make such a trip, and did not know if it would be forthcoming. However, I said
an exchange of views might well be useful and that I would find out and let him
know.”
After meeting with RFK in Washington the next day,
RFK told Attwood he would pass on the information to McGeorge Bundy.
Attwood then reported, “On September 27, I ran into
Lechuga at the United Nations, where he was doing a television interview in the
lobby with Miss Howard. I told him that I had discussed our talk in
Washington,….meanwhile, he forewarned me that he would be making a ‘hard’
anti-US Speech in the United Nations on October 7,…”
Besides Attwood’s back channel communications with
Lechuga, Attwood also got further input from other sources, as he mentions, “On
October 18, at dinner at the home of Mrs. Eugene Meyer, I talked with Mr. C. A.
Doxiades, a noted Greek architect and town-planner, who had just returned from
an architects congress in Havana, where he had talked alone to both Castro and
Guevara, among others. He sought me out, as a government official, to say he
was convinced Castro would welcome normalization of relations with the United
States if he could do so without loosing too much face…”
Two days later, Lisa Howard asked Attwood to make a
telephone call to Major Rene Vallejo, a Cuban surgeon who is identified as
“Castro’s right hand man and confidant.” Howard explained how Vallejo assisted
her in meeting Castro, “and made it plain he opposed the Guevara group.”
Attwood and Vallejo then had a number of telephone conversations from Howard’s
New York apartment.
On October 21 1963 Gordon Chase, the National
Security Council aide to McGeorge Bundy, called Attwood from the White House to
be brought up to date, and Attwood concluded that “the ball was in his court.”
That night, the CIA raider ship Rex pulled out of
its moorings at West Palm Beach, Florida, not far from President Kennedy’s
Florida home, on a mission that would create the considerable noise level that
would make the cover of the New York Times.
The Rex was on a mission, according to William
Turner (Rearview Mirror – Penmarin Books, CA. 2001, p. 185-186), “a sabotage
attack on a shore installation in Pinar del Rio Province,” and deposit a team
of commando assassins infiltrators. “It was a CIA operation,” with an all Cuban
crew, says Turner. He also reports, “When a mission was scheduled, they
received a phone call, then a nondescript CIA van picked them up and took them
to the West Palm Beach berth where the Rex was tied up. The dockage fees were
paid by a CIA front, Sea Shipping Company, which operated out of a post office
box.”
The Captain of the Rex, Alejandro Brooks, received
his orders from Gordon Campbell, the director of the CIA’s naval operations.
“The men belonged to the Commando Mambises,…the CIA’s elite, the Green Berets
of the secret war. They were led by Major Manuel Villafana, a spit-and-polish
officer who had commanded the Bay of Pigs air force. Villafana insisted that
his men be paid low because he wanted them driven by hate, not money.”
According to Turner, “The Rex was not listed in
Jane’s Fighting Ships. It was a World War II subchaser pulled out of the
mothball fleet at Green Cove Springs, Florida. Painted a classy dark blue, the
174-foot vessel could cut through the waves at twenty knots. It flew the
blue-and-white flag of Nicaragua, whose strongman, General Luis Somoza, had
hosted the Bay of Pigs invasion brigade…”
“There were oversized searchlights, elaborate
electronics gear that towered amidships, and a large crane on the aft deck
capable of raising and lowering twenty-foot speed boats,” wrote Turner. “After
the Rex put to sea, its guns were brought up from below decks and secured in
their topside mounts: two 40-mm naval cannon, a 57-mm recoilless rifle, and two
20-mm cannon.”
Having interviewed some of the crewmembers, Turner
got a full report on what happened. “The target on this mission was the giant
Matahambre copper mine near Cape Corriente on the bootheel of Pinar del Rio
Province…when the Rex arrived at the landing zone, there was a sense of
foreboding: the Cape Corriente light, normally flashing a warning to maritime
traffic, was dark….As the vessel came to a stop, two specially designed fiberglass
speedboats, called Moppies, slid down the high-speed davits on the
afterdeck…They were to link up with two commandos who had infiltrated a week
earlier to reconnoiter the target. The answer came back in the wrong code; it
was a trap.”
“The commandos fired at the riverbank,” only to be
raked by return fire from heavy machine guns. One raft was torn apart by tracer
bullets, spilling the dead and dying into the water…Then one of the Moppies was
framed in the searchlights of a Russian built P-6 patrol craft: the Rex
quartermaster piloting it surrendered….Brooks made a feint toward open sea,
then doubled back and hugged the coastline…The move paid off. Minutes later, a
pair of Cuban helicopters…dropped flares…..(illuminating)…the 32,500 ton J.
Louis, …carrying a cargo of bauxite from Jamaica to Texas. Five Cuban MiGs
began strafing….US Navy Phantom jets took off and headed for the scene. But
just before arriving, the Phantoms were called back….”
A few days later Fidel Castro appeared on Cuban
television and described the Rex, and introduced two of the men missing from
the Rex, quartermaster Luis Montera Carranzana and Dr. Clemente Inclan Werner,
a Mambasie.
When questioned by the press, White House press
secretary said, “We have nothing to say.”
On November 1, 1963, not only the CIA and the Cubans
knew the details, but everyone who read the New York Times, who published a
photo of the Rex on their front page and reported the ship was registered out
of Nicaragua, owned by the Belcher Oil Company of Miami, and leased to the
Collins Radio Company International, of Richardson, Texas, for the ostensible
purpose of “electronic and oceanographic research.”
Since reporting to Gordon Chase of the NSC on October
21, the day of the Rex mission, William Attwood had progressed further with the
back channel negotiations in New York. Attwood later reported, “On October 28,
I ran into Lechuga in the UN Delegates Lounge…. I said it was up to him and he
could call me if he felt like it. He wrote down my extension.”
On October 31, Halloween, (David Phillips birthday),
Vellejo in Cuba called Miss Howard, reporting that Castro, “…would very much
like to talk to the US official anytime and appreciated the importance of discretion
to all concerned.”
A week after Attwood reported the progress of his
negotiations with the Cubans to Bundy and Chase at the White House (on November
5), a meeting was held in Washington, with CIA Director John McCone presenting
an update on the situation in Cuba and an evaluation of the sabotage program.
Besides the President, Secretaries McNamara, Rusk,
Vance and RFK, General Taylor was there, along with Sec. Gilpatrick, and from
the CIA, Helms, FitzGerald and Shackley puts in an appearance.
McCone’s memo reports that he opened the meeting
with a brief resume of conditions in Cuba along these lines, “
1) Cuba still
belongs to Castro though his grip is weakening,
2) The military remains
essentially loyal to Castro,
3) the internal security forces and apparatus are
effective,
4) The economy is bad and deteriorating,
5) The Soviets are
continuing a gradual withdraw,
6) Training of Cubans continues,
7) The only
equipment which has been withdrawn has been the advanced C-band radar for SAM
and certain communication equipment…”
“McCone then stated that the program which had been
followed for the last several months, having been approved about the first of
June [June 19], was integrated and interdependent one part on the other and
therefore should be considered as a comprehensive program and not a number of
independent actions.”
FitzGerald also made a presentation, a progress
report on the six-point covert program proposed by the CIA [on June 8] and
endorsed by JFK.
According to the meeting minutes, “Rusk had no
problem with infiltration of black teams…However he opposed the hit-and-run
sabotage tactics as being unproductive, complicating our relationship with the
Soviets and also with our friends and indicated a connection between our
sabotage activities and the autobahn problem.” [Note: Berlin]
McCone concludes, “The President asked questions
concerning the immediate operations, and the next one on the schedule was
approved.”
The same day McCone conducted this meeting, McGeorge
Bundy, the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs wrote a
memo, described by White as indicating that “JFK was interested in generating a
dialog with Castro via intermediaries, though he did not want the talks to
commence in Cuba.”
On November 11, Vallejo called Lisa Howard to
reiterate the need for security about the back channel talks, and to say, as
Attwood later reported, “Castro would go along with any arrangements we might
want to make…He emphasized that only Castro and himself would be present at the
talks and that no one else – he specifically mentioned Guevara – would be
involved. Vallejo also reiterated Castro’s desire for this talk and hoped to
hear our answer soon.”
Attwood and Bundy talked again the next day
(November 12) and Attwood visited Howard’s apartment on November 13, but when
they called Vallejao at home in Cuba, there was no answer, so the sent a
telegram.
The following day (November 14) Vallejo called
Howard, and set up a phone call for November 18 when, as Attwood reported.
“Miss Howard reached Vallejo at home and passed the phone to me. I told him….of
our interests in hearing what Castro had in mind….Vallejo…reiterated the
invitation to come to Cuba, stressing the fact that security could be
guaranteed. I replied that a preliminary meeting was essential to make sure
there was something useful to talk about, and asked if he was able to come to
New York…” Attwood and Vellejo then talked about setting “an agenda” for a
later meeting with Castro. On November 19, Attwood reported this conversation
to Gordon Chase.
Even before the assassination the accused assassin,
Lee Harvey Oswald, was associated with Cubans of the Student Revolutionary
Directorate (DRE), whose members included the CIA raider boat crew sponsored by
Clare Booth Luce, who previously featured them in Life magazine.
On November 22nd, 1963, John Martino, one of the
crewmembers of the June 8, Flying Tiger II mission, expressed foreknowledge and
details of the assassination, and previously appeared in Dallas with other
anti-Castro Cuban exiles (ie. Odio) who associated with the accused assassin.
Shortly after the assassination, Dallas policeman
J.D. Tippit would be killed in Oak Cliff, allegedly by the same man accused of
assassinating the President. At the time of Tippit’s murder, the same accused
assassin and alleged cop killer would be seen in Oak Cliff in a Plymouth sedan
owned by Tippit’s good friend, who worked at Collins Radio, of Richardson,
Texas, the company that leased the Rex.
The night of the assassination, Clare Booth Luce
received a telephone call from one of the Cuban crewman of the boat she
sponsored, Julio Fernandez, who said he had a tape recording of the accused
assassin and additional evidence that he was a pro-Castro Communist, continuing
the black propaganda operation to blame the assassination on Castro.
The Dealey Plaza operation that resulted in the
assassination of the President was directly connected to these three specific
covert anti-Castro Cuban maritime missions that became known – the June mission
of the Flying Tiger II, the Oct. 21-30 mission of the Rex and the operations of
the DRE boat crew sponsored by Clare Booth Luce.
All three of these covert maritime operations that
are associated with what happened at Dealey Plaza can be traced back to their
administrative origins at the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the DOD (CINCLAT
revised), the Cuban Coordinating Committee – Covert Operations in Cuba
(CCC-COC), the Cottrell Committee of the Special Group, the Standing Group of
the National Security Council and the covert sabotage operations approved by
the President.
It is most likely that sometime before November 22
the crewmembers of these operations learned about the Atwood-Lechuga back
channel negotiations, which provided motivation for their compliance with the
Dealey Plaza operation, the assassination of the President and coup d’etat.
On the day of the assassination, William Attwood
recognized the significance of his back channel actions, and wrote a memo
detailing what occurred for the record and suspected the complicity of the
anti-Castro Cubans when he wrote, “If the CIA did find out what we were doing,
this would have trickled down to the lower echelon of activists, and Cuban
exiles, and…. I can understand why they would have reacted so violently.”
1 comment:
An interesting read, Mr. Kelly, thanks for sharing this insightful piece.
While reading along I could envision a smirk upon the smug face of the late Agency spymaster James Jesus Angleton, whose testimony to the Church Committee way back in the '70's remains sealed to this day.
IF a lone gunman is all to it, then why all the continued concealment of vital records still shrouded in secrecy some 55 years hence?! Thanks for your continued promotion of shedding light, truth and justice in this case.
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